THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DISCOVERY OF OIL ON THE PEOPLE OF CAPE THREE POINT IN GHANA by DORDJIE, Amos Tetteh
THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE DISCOVERY OF OIL ON THE 
PEOPLE OF CAPE THREE POINT IN GHANA 
 
 
 
 
By 
DORDJIE AMOS TETTEH 
 
 
 
 
 
This Thesis is presented as 
partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of  
Master of Science in International Cooperation Policy 
 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES 
RITSUMEIKANASIA PACIFIC UNIVERSITY, JAPAN  
September 2011 
i 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
For oil economies, higher oil prices are expected to be a blessing rather than a curse. 
Bringing the oil to the surface and then getting it to a market, however have major 
environmental, economic, social, cultural, and health impacts (Edoigiawerie & 
Spickett, 1998). The harmony between significant oil wealth and large-scale poverty 
is certainly a “paradox of plenty” (AfDB, 2009), if not an outright resource curse in 
itself. The core of this statement is to come up with a system that will create long 
lasting wealth in the long run rather than short run, as the case of oil boom may bring 
to a nation, and translate it to capital in the form of human development, financial and 
infrastructure for a more sustainable livelihood. 
This study takes a critical look at the outcomes of oil production on the selected oil 
economies from Africa, Middle East, Asia; Latin America and the Scandinavia in 
relation to socioeconomic development of their societies. Three themes were 
discussed, including; oil economies, Dutch disease and 1973 oil crises and its impacts 
on socioeconomic development.    
The main objectives for this research include: to comprehend the prospects of oil 
production on the socioeconomic development of the communities in Cape Three 
Point; to discuss the effect of oil production on poverty reduction; to identify critical 
problems that would be against the socio economic and cultural lives of the people; to 
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make recommendations that would inform decision making in safe guarding the 
peace and harmony of the communities in Cape Three Point. 
The methodology was based on secondary data constructed from World Bank 
database, United Nations Development Program on human development, 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International 
Monitoring Fund financial statistics and Asia Development Bank, Ghana statistics 
service and National Accounts Statistics of Norway. Both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques were employed to construct graphs and statistical tables. The lessons 
learnt were used to compare with the economic features of Ghana. 
The outcomes showed that most African oil economies lagged behind Scandinavia, 
Middle East, Asia and Latin America in terms of human development. Not much 
attention was paid to human resource development, the problems of poor training of 
teachers‟, high student-teacher ratios, poor quality of textbooks, lack of other 
teaching and learning equipment and an emphasis on rote learning rather than 
problem solving are still unresolved. Ghana has great challenges with health sector 
including the human resource shortages, healthcare financing and lack of multi-
sectoral collaboration among the players in the health delivery system. Other 
outcomes include, fiscal indiscipline, Dutch disease or resource curse, 
mismanagement, accountability and corruption, lack of agriculture farmlands and 
land dispute, cultural acculturation, poor community cohesiveness, poor institutional 
capacity, and poor policy formulation and implementation. 
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As a way forward, institutional capacity building and its connection with the 
socioeconomic development are extremely important for Ghana to enhance the 
relationships amongst production, accumulation of capital and equitable distribution. 
Consensus building at the design stage around what the oil rents are to be used for 
and how they should be managed, is the surest way to ensure its proper management. 
Thirdly, Stabilization Fund (SF) is recommended for both national and the 
communities with stricter accountability and transparency guidelines. Furthermore, 
revenue allocation to poverty reduction projects and income distribution is crucial 
element to expand equality and reducing level of income inequality. Finally, 
communities should be engaged in more extensive and deeper level of neighbor 
interaction; the more the residents would have positive evaluations of neighbor 
relations, the likelihood to feel a sense of community in the communities. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
One compelling question that faces Ghana at the moment is how to find a way to 
manage the emerging oil industry for economic growth and social development. In 
other words what can be done with the revenue of oil discovered so that it becomes a 
blessing rather than a curse to the nation. One probable answer is to learn from the 
experiences of oil producing economies and less resourced countries to better manage 
the oil to improve the socioeconomic development of Ghana. This study takes a 
critical look at the outcomes of oil production on selected economies represented by 
Algeria, Angola, and Nigeria (for Africa); Saudi Arabia and Qatar in the Middle East-
; Indonesia and Malaysia in Asia; Mexico and Venezuela in Latin America and 
Norway for Scandinavia in relation to the socioeconomic development of their 
societies.  
The observations are carried out with respect to life expectancy, literacy rate, infant 
and child mortality and unemployment. This comes on the heels of the debate in 
Ghana on the emerging oil industry and how it can be managed to reduce poverty, as 
well as, propel the country for an industrial take off. The term socioeconomic 
landscape shows the apparent capacities of the economy to produce an adequate and 
growing supply of goods and services in an efficient way to accumulate capital and to 
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distribute the fruits of production in a relatively equitable manner. In a narrower 
sense and in respect of impact assessment, the focus is directed towards the countries‟ 
achievement at the macroeconomic level, and it‟s relationship with social indicators 
on individual lives in these countries. 
The above countries adopted different approaches in the management of the oil 
windfall. Majority chose the path of massive state-sponsored-import-substitution-
industrialization-model as a means to transform socioeconomic structures of the 
economy leading to good health, education, and employment. This economic 
strategy, however, could not meet the expectations of both policy makers and the 
people. As a result, the countries resorted to painful economic reforms, by opening up 
their economies for investment. Thus they turned away from the path of a primary 
commodity driven-economy to a multi-commodity export driven approach for 
economic growth to enhance socioeconomic development.  
Many researchers such as Wheeler (1984), Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Gylfason 
(1999), who study about natural resources have suggested that it can be a blessing or 
a curse to a nation. The resource curse ironically explains that the natural resource 
abundance causes less growth than the lack of natural resources. Auty and Mikesell 
(1998), for example, study on natural resources provided empirical evidence that 
most successful developing countries are resource-less, and that the resource-rich 
countries averaged relatively slow growth or stagnation during the past three decades. 
Sachs and Warner (1995) have shown that economies with a high ratio of natural 
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resource exports tend to have low GDP growth rates. Another aspect of resource 
curse is that countries rich in resources are more prone to growth collapses than 
resource-deficient ones (Auty, 2001). Overall, there is strong evidence that states with 
abundant resource wealth perform less well, than their resource-less counterparts. 
Even though, (Ross, 1999) intimates that there is little agreement on why this occurs 
many explanations have been offered to support the reasons why resource rich 
countries under-perform despite their abundance. Auty (2001) elaborates exogenous 
and internal reasons, where one of the exogenous explanations referred to the 
phenomenon of Dutch disease.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
 
Four out of ten regions in Ghana had more than 40% of their population living in 
poverty in 1999. The worst affected being the three northern savannah regions (the 
Upper East, Upper West and Northern Regions). Nine out of ten people in the Upper 
West; eight out of ten in the Upper East, seven out of ten in the Northern Region and 
five out of ten in the Central and Eastern Regions were classified as poor in 2005, 
(Poverty Reduction Paper, 2005). The rest of the regions have four out of ten living in 
abject poverty (Poverty Reduction Paper, 2005). Among the poor, female headed 
households formed 52 percent of the total (Poverty Reduction Paper, 2005). 
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Map 1: Poverty Map of Ghana 
 
 
Source: www.ndpc.gov.gh 
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These households and communities live in conditions that are characterized by low 
income, malnutrition, ill health, illiteracy, lack of access to safe water and sanitation 
facilities, as well as general insecurity. These conditions combine to keep households 
and whole communities in persistent poverty. Ghana‟s living standards survey (2004) 
has indicated that relative to much touted goals by the government for reducing 
poverty from 40% to 28%, it does not reflect the realities on the ground. Instead, the 
extreme poverty has received marginal reduction from about 36.5% to above 28% 
over the past 20 years, for both rural and urban areas since 1990.  
 
Recent poverty indicators issued in the Ghana‟s millennium goals progress report 
(MDG, 2006), showed that the country has managed to halve the proportion of people 
living in extreme poverty from about 36.5 percent in 1991/92 to about 18.2 percent in 
2005/2006 (see Table 1). This means that the MDG‟s first goal of halving the 
proportion of the population in extreme poverty by 2015 has been achieved well 
ahead of target date, thereby making Ghana the first Sub-Saharan African country to 
achieve this MDG.  
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Table 1.1: Trends in Poverty Incidence by Region and Location, 1990-2006 
 
Regions Proportion below the lower 
(Extreme) poverty line 
1991/92 1998/99 2005/2006 
Greater Accra 13.0 2.4 6.2 
Eastern 35.0 30.4 6.6 
Western  42.0 14.0 7.9 
Central 24.0 31.0 9.7 
Ashanti 25.0 16.4 11.2 
Brong Ahafo 46.0 18.8 14.9 
Volta 42.0 20.4 15.2 
Northern 54.0 57.4 38.7 
Upper West 74.0 68.3 79.0 
Upper East 53.0 88.0 60.1 
Urban 15.1 11.6 5.7 
Rural 47.2 34.4 25.6 
National 36.5 26.8 18.2 
 
                                 Source: Ghana Statistical Services, (2007) 
 
Some progress have been made in the three regions in the Upper East, Upper west, 
and Northern  regions having figures above 38 percent. The rest of the regions have 
about 6.2 percent to 15.2 percent. 
 
For many Ghanaians, the oil discovery has come in the most opportune time for 
poverty reduction in poverty stricken communities. Prior to the beginning of oil 
production, some local farmers have started giving away their farmlands to 
developers for commercial activities. The expectation is that the oil industry will 
offer them employment and that they will live a better life than before. Similarly, the 
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rest of the country especially the youth are also preparing themselves to migrate to 
the oil mining communities for employment and better life than what agriculture, 
manufacturing and service sectors provide them. Before inception of the oil 
production, the oil companies have demarcated 500 meter exclusion zones around 
drilling ships and a 1,000 meter exclusion zone around the Floating Production 
Storage Offloading(drilling-ship FPSO.140), making it unlawful for fishermen to fish 
close to the demarcation.  
 
Already, the Jubilee Consortium that runs the oil drilling and the Navy have managed 
two incidences with fishing boats, including boats tying themselves to drilling 
platforms. The government has not made much effort to manage the growing tensions 
that are gradually building up amongst fishing communities, the oil companies, and 
local security forces. Secondly, there is no clear demarcation to the restricted zone or 
rules for joint use of the sea, (ISODEC & Oxford America, 2008). There was another 
incident with which the Navy has intercepted fishing boats and confiscated their catch 
for allegedly going too close to oil installations. These incidents attest to the fact that 
Ghana is gradually bracing itself for real socioeconomic problems in the area.  
 
Local chiefs, opinion leaders and politicians are already laying claim for a “right” to 
all earmarked benefits. The Ahanta West, Nzema East, and Jomoro Districts are also 
aligning themselves to the project in this regard. The key interests developed by the 
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local chiefs was the result of the bad impacts that gold mining has left on the people 
of Obuasi and it‟s environment in the Ashanti region and Tarkwa in the Western 
region of Ghana. They are suggesting 10 percent share of oil benefits that would be 
accrued to the country or treat them as a „special case‟ in the allocation of the oil 
benefits. As Asagyefo Ogyeahohoo (one of the traditional chiefs in the coastal 
community) put it “We will not sit down for the wealth to elude us; we are ready to 
fight for what rightfully belongs to us” (ISODEC & Oxford America, 2008).  
 
The International Financial Corporation (IFC) has categorized the project in the 
Jubilee field as “category B”, which means that the project is expected to have 
limited adverse social and or environmental impact that can be broadly addressed 
through mitigation measures, instead of “category A”(ISODEC & Oxford America, 
2008) 
 
This categorization has raised the eye brow among most Ghanaians as to whether the 
impact of oil has a correlation with this categorization, and brings to reflection the oil 
spill in Gulf of Mexico in 2010. It can be argued that the initial development stages of 
oil in the Gulf of Mexico might have either „category A” (expected to have 
significant adverse social and/or environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible, 
or unprecedented.) or “category B”, but brought untold hardship to three states in 
America (Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama). The assessment of the situation in the 
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three states revealed the degree of the impacts of oil spillage on environmental, 
economic and social effects on the lives of the people. The widespread nature of the 
situation has compelled the Obama Administration to force BP to create $ 20 billion 
fund for the reparation of the affected people. One cannot but accept the fact that the 
impacts of oil have no respect to these categorizations.   
 
Experts at the Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana (IEA 2009) have stated that 
Ghana has no plan to develop a “strategic environmental and social plan” that would 
consider the impact of the oil production on the communities and the region as a 
whole. This study seeks to assess the socioeconomic outcomes of oil producing 
economies on life expectancy, literacy rate, unemployment and infant mortality and 
the lessons available for Ghana and the people of Cape Three Point. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
• Does oil production stimulate economic growth?  
• How does oil revenue contribute to the quality life of the people in an oil 
economy? 
• Does oil production strengthen social cohesion amongst the people in the host 
communities as compared to non oil countries?  
• What are the problems that are associated with oil production which can affect 
the socioeconomic lives of the people?  
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1.4 Objectives of the research 
 
The main objectives for this research are:  
• To comprehend the prospects of oil production on the socioeconomic 
development of the communities in Cape Three Point.  
• To discuss the effects of oil production for poverty reduction.  
• To identify critical problems that would be against the social, economic and 
cultural lives of the people.  
• To make recommendations that would help in informed decision making in 
guarding the peace and harmony of the communities in Cape Three Point 
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
 
The research is expected to provide insights into oil production in relation to GDP per 
capita income and the socioeconomic development of the selected countries. The 
relationships between economic growth and literacy rate, infant mortality, life 
expectancy, and unemployment will provide the basis for Ghana to determine the sort 
of economic and social strategies that are necessary for the emerging oil industry so 
as to avoid resource curse.  
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It will also lay to rest the speedy socioeconomic development that policy makers 
aspire to achieve overnight and channel the course that will prevent „one path 
commodity led growth‟, to „multiple paths of commodities‟ as Norway has done. 
Those countries that learn how to learn from developed economies, as in the case of 
Japan and Singapore, in the beginning of their developmental process, have 
progressively improved socioeconomic lives of their population. It will bring to focus 
the critical problems that may hinder the socio economic and cultural development of 
the people. Above all, draw the attention of policy makers on the necessary 
intervention needed for the creation of good competitive environment for the 
production of oil, and the need to focus on other sectors rather than oil for poverty 
reduction. 
 
1.6 Conceptual framework 
 
 
The conceptual framework for the study is built on three themes. The first theme 
describes the oil economy, with respect to initial migration and production; the 
influence of oil on agriculture in the local economy, the land disputes and its effects 
on poverty using the economy of Norway, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Algeria, Iran and 
Venezuela. The second theme examines the concept of the Dutch Disease with a 
focus on Botswana and a brief discussion on how it managed the Dutch disease in 
relation to the diamond industry. The discussion is extended to cover Indonesia and 
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Nigeria and the economic strategy adopted to manage the Dutch disease. The third 
theme discusses the 1973/1990 oil crises and the aftermath in managing crises in oil 
economies. Figure 1.1 summarizes the conceptual framework using the three themes 
listed above.  
Figure 1.1: Conceptual framework 
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
           
        
Source: Compiled by the Author 
The discussions will focus less on regional groups‟ levels but more on individual 
country levels with regards to macro and microeconomic trends. This will bring to 
bear the performance outcomes of production, accumulation of wealth and its 
distribution through government policies to improve the socioeconomic lives of the 
population. The aggregate trends are important for comparison in relation to the 
variables {health-(infant and child mortality, life expectancy), education- (literacy 
rate), and unemployment}.  
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Initial domestic conditions within each of the countries are mostly determined by 
domestic developments, although they are influenced by external factors. We assume 
the initial conditions are held constant, rather than trying to explain them, though they 
are important in the determination of final outcomes. In terms of policy choices and 
targets, we are particularly interested in economic variables including growth rate and 
inflation rate, the structure of output and unemployment and links with social 
characteristics such as infant/child mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates. 
 
The ability of governments to make and implement policy decisions is also important 
in a productive economy.  Institutional capacity is therefore imperative in the 
determination of final outcomes. This is seriously considered in the framework. At 
the firm level, the accumulated learning and productive capacity are elements that 
governments take into account in overall output (GDP) performance. 
The study gives brief analysis on migration as a consequence of investment into oil 
production. The aggregate output relates to the interactions among the sectors in 
determining gross domestic production growth of the countries. The uncertainty and 
volatility of key macroeconomic variables that usually hang on the neck of 
developing countries is also worthy of examination. The three variables: health, 
education and unemployment are also necessary for discussion. Health takes a look at 
infant mortality and life expectancy, which have been problematic for developing 
economies. Education examines literacy rates of the various countries to discuss the 
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outcomes.  This is not to determine who is doing well or bad, but to discuss the 
outcomes of some policies implemented by some of these countries.  
The growth-accountability framework postulates that the process of growth of an 
economy depends on the type of technology to be incorporated into the production 
and employment generation. The conceptual framework takes into account 
unemployment situation in these countries. 
 
1.7 Scope of the research 
 
This study covers a cross-section of oil economies selected from Africa, Middle East, 
Asia, Latin America and Scandinavia. Among the African oil economies, Nigeria, 
Libya, Angola, and Algeria were selected for discussion.  The Middle East is 
represented by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates; Indonesia and 
Malaysia are used as Asian examples. Norway for Scandinavia and Mexico and 
Venezuela for Latin America are used. Botswana and Chile were also selected, for 
their experiences in the production of diamond and copper and the way they managed 
issues related to the Dutch disease.  
For oil producing countries, they were selected on their natural resource endowment, 
and their strong historical experience in oil production. This is expected to give better 
understanding of the impact of oil production on their economies. The lessons learnt 
are compared with the economic outlooks for Ghana. Four socioeconomic indicators 
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have been selected to determine the outcomes at the macroeconomic levels. They 
include infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy rates, and unemployment. These 
variables were used to match up with the performance of rich oil states and rich non-
oil states. Each of the themes have different time frame, using the logical framework 
in Figure 4.1. The first theme, on oil economies, briefly describes the historical 
experiences of migration from the beginning of oil production in the 1920s and its 
effects on the other sectors of the economy. It is assumed that the oil production in 
tandem with other sectors produce aggregate outcomes, which eventually impact on 
the four variables. The second theme shifts attention to the Dutch disease in the post 
1965 periods, when most countries had attained independence and economic 
decisions are made by citizens relative to the four variables. The third theme focuses 
on the 1973 oil crisis and its aftermath. This takes the discussion to 2000, when most 
countries experience turbulence in their growth.  
The thesis proceeds to discuss the outcomes in the above themes over the period 
1980-2008 in respect of infant mortality, life expectancy, literacy rates and 
unemployment. The final concluding chapter discusses the lessons with the 
socioeconomic outlook of Ghana on the variables stated above. 
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1.8 Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis has been organized into seven chapters, Chapter one, gives the background 
and the conceptual framework that underpin the agenda for the research. It also 
comments on the problem statement, research objectives, research questions and the 
significance of the research. Chapter two describes the socioeconomic profile of 
Ghana. Chapter three explores the literature on the impact of natural resources wealth 
on the socioeconomic development of the people. It also explores socioeconomic 
breakdowns and the onset of conflicts and finally looks at the natural resource 
abundance and socioeconomic lives of the people in oil economies. Chapter four 
explains the methodologies in respect of the theoretical framework, data construction 
and data analysis. Chapter five addresses the analysis of the data with respect to the 
themes. Chapter six discusses the performance outcomes in the form of comparison 
of the themes using the data construction. Chapter seven explains the findings and 
discusses the recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILE OF GHANA 
 
This chapter discusses the profile of Ghana, in respect of physical characteristics 
including the location and size, climate, vegetation, natural resource endowment; 
demographic features such as population and occupation; political administration, 
economic activities and social characteristics such as education and health; brief 
features of Ahanta West District (Cape Three Point) by commenting on the social and 
political administration of Cape Three Point and the geography of hydrocarbon in 
Ghana.  
 
2.1 Physical Characteristics of Ghana 
 
2.1.1 Location and Size 
 
Ghana is located on the west coast of Africa, about 750 km north of the equator 
between latitudes 4 and 11.5
0
 North and longitude 3.11
0
 West and 1.11
0
 East. It is 
bounded on the north by Burkina Faso, east by Togo; west by Cote d'Ivoire and south 
by the Gulf of Guinea (Atlantic Ocean). It has a total land area of 238,837 sq km that 
stretches from the north to south and 357 km east to west. Out of 23 million hectares 
total land area, 13 million hectares (57%) is suitable for agricultural production, and 
5.3 million hectares (39%) of this is under cultivation. It also has about 540 km of 
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coastline. The topography is relatively flat and altitude of 500m, with more than half 
below 200m. It has highlands and steep escapements in the middle portion towards 
the east rising to above 800m.  
Map 2: Geographical location of Ghana 
 
 
Source: http://www.infoplease.com/atlas/country/ghana.html 
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2.1.2 Climate  
 
Ghana has two tropical climatic seasons- major and minor. The major season is the 
period when the country receives rainfall caused by the doldrums (south-west 
monsoon winds) that move from the Atlantic Ocean into the country in April/May to 
August. The minor season usually has dry and dusty condition and is caused by the 
north east trade winds that move from the Saharan desert towards the south, between 
September to March in each year. The annual rainfall is between 2,250mm to 
1,500mm with an average annual temperature of 27
0
C and 30
0
C for both major and 
minor seasons respectively. 
 
2.1.3 Vegetation 
 
The vegetation varies across the country; south-western to central part of Ghana is 
covered by evergreen and semi deciduous forests, with tall silk cottons, kolas and 
hardwoods such as mahogany, odum, and ebony. The north is covered by savanna, 
with shea trees, acacias, and baobabs. Oil palm is found across the southern to the 
middle belt upland. Most part of the coastal belt has shrubs and mangroves swamps 
along the east to the central and part of the western region. There are also sacred 
forest areas across the country, which are used for religious celebrations and festivals, 
and are often protected and preserved.  
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The vegetation for the Ahanta District (Cape Three Points) in the western region is 
mainly moist deciduous forest, where most tress shed their leaves during the hot and 
dry season, {a period of rest for the trees}. Rapid growth takes place in the wet 
season, when the trees are covered with leaves.  
Map 3. Vegetation Zones of Ghana 
 
 
Source: ISRIC World information database, 2004 
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The vegetation has five different layers. The first layer is the Tree Stratum zone. The 
Tree Stratum zone contains trees such as oak, beech, maple, chestnut hickory, 
basswood, linden, walnut, and sweet gum trees, with about 60 feet and 100 feet in 
height. 
 
The second layer consists of small tree and sapling with young and short trees 
dominating the vegetation. The third zone is called the shrub layer, some of which are 
rhododendrons, azaleas, mountain laurel, and huckleberries. The Herbal zone is the 
fourth zone made up of short plants such as herbal plants and finally, ground zone 
with club mosses, and true mosses. Logging and farming activities are the topmost 
factors treating the forest in most part of the district.  Cape Three Points has a forest 
reserve which occupies an area of 51.02 square kilometers.  
 
2.1.4 Natural Resources 
 
Ghana is associated with mineral resources, such as gold, diamond, manganese, 
bauxite, limestone, iron ore, as well as clay and granite deposits. The recent oil 
discovery has added up to the existing stock of natural resources available to the 
country. Extensive forests are seen with a permanent rain forest reserve of 252 km 
land size. Ghana produces cocoa in large quantities and currently is the second world 
largest producer of cocoa; and third largest producer of timber as well as, second 
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largest exporter of wood and wood products to African countries. Other resources 
include marine fishing, exotic wildlife and exciting natural parks and game reserves. 
 
2.2 Demography and employment characteristics 
 
 
The 2000 Population and Housing Census indicates that Ghana has a total population 
of about 18.8 million, of which 11.3 million were economically active with an annual 
population whose growth rate was 2.7 percent. Labour force (15yrs-64yrs) constituted 
8.4 million, about 44.7% of the total population. Out of this number, 50.7 percent of 
the labour force is engaged in agriculture, {approximately, 39 percent of farm labour 
force are women}, 33 percent in services and 16.3 percent in industrial sector.  
 
According to the population and housing census 2010 (full report due to be released 
by Ghana statistical service later in 2011), Ghana has a total population of 24, 233, 
431, comprising 48.7 percent male and 51.3 percent female. The population 
distribution varied across the 10 administrative regions and eco-zones of the country, 
with 68 percent and 32 percent living in the rural and urban areas respectively. The 
labour force in agriculture is 56 percent; while services sector recorded 29 percent 
and 15 percent in industry sector.  
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Economically Active Population  
and GDP by Sectors (%) 
 
Year Agriculture Industry Service 
1984 61.1 (47.9) 12.8 (19.6) 26.1 (22.1) 
1992 62.2 (37.8) 10.0 (25.0) 27.8 (27.0) 
1998 55.0 (36.7) 14.0 (25.1) 31.0 (29.1) 
2000 50.7 (36.0) 16.3 (25.2 33.0 (29.7) 
2010 56.0 (33.7) 15.0  (24.7) 29.0 (41.6) 
 
Source: Employment figures from GLSS 3&4 and 1984 and 2000  
 Population Census; GDP figures from Quarterly Digest of Statistics 
 
 
2.3 Political Administration 
 
The country has 10 administrative regions and 170 Metropolitan, Municipal and 
District Assemblies. Ghana set out for constitutional governance following the 1992 
referendum which gave birth to the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. Since then, the 
country is gradually emerging as a maturing democratic state after ushering in 
constitutional rule about 20-years ago. It exercises legislative, executive and judicial 
independence and ensures freedom of press and electronic media, and ombudsman 
protects the rights of the citizen. General elections are held every four year for 
president and the legislature. 
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2.4 Social Indicators 
 
Since 2000, the adult literacy rate has been increasing. Statistical information from 
UN Human development database shows that in 2000, Ghana recorded 57.92 percent, 
which increased to 63.4 percent in 2005. It further increased to 65.02 percent in 2007 
and accounted for 65.82 in 2008.  
The infant and child mortality rates follow a pattern of a quadratic function, where it 
fell initially and rose and again falls. Statistics shows that in 1990 the mortality rate 
was 118, it then fell in a decade to 111 in 2000 and continued to fall in 2005, 
thereafter rose to 115 in 2007, and finally falls again to 76 in 2008. Life expectancy 
has not shown much increase as expected. In 1980 it was 53, and this increased to 
57.2 and 57.9 for 1990 and 2000 respectively. The figures recorded in 2000 showed a 
fall to 56.5 and remained relatively constant up to 2008. 
 
2.5 The Geography of oil in Ghana and Cape Three Point 
 
The offshore oil search started in 1898 when an estimated hundred exploration wells 
were drilled by the British along the coast. At that time, the exploration was limited 
to certain areas along the coast due to the uncertainty in the nature of the topography 
as well as the risks involved. After independence in 1957, Ghana carried on the 
search for oil until 1970 when significant quantities of offshore oil reserves were 
discovered in Saltpond central basin. In 1983, Ghana proceeded to set up the Ghana 
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National Corporation (GNPC), to promote exploration and production of oil and other 
related energy resources in the sector (GNPC, Act 1983). Map 4 shows the general 
hydrocarbon exploration outlook in Ghana. 
Map 4: Hydrocarbon explorations in Ghana 
 
 
Source: Oxford America and ISODEC, {2009:20} 
Other potential sites for offshore oil were explored, which included the Tano river 
basin, Accra sub-basin and Tano basin. In 1989, about 6,900 barrels per day of oil 
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was produced in Tano Basin, of which three companies (two American and one 
Dutch) invested US$ 30 million into the drilling activities. 
A consortium comprising Kosmos Energy, Tullow oil and Anadarko oil were forged 
in 2005, to explore oil in the western coast of Ghana where oil was struck in 
commercial quantities at the Mahogany-1 well (Jubilee field) with an estimated oil 
reserve of about 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 800 billion cubic feet of gas (Tullow oil 
2007). Map 5 gives a detailed topography of mining in the Jubilee field. 
Map 5: Oil mining in the western region (Cape Three Point) of Ghana 
 
 
Source: Oxford America/ ISODEC Research (2009: 19) 
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The Jubilee field overlaps with two oil blocks (see map) in the deep Atlantic waters 
offshore from western Ghana, approximately 63 kilometers (39 miles) from the coast 
and 132 kilometers (83 miles) southwest of Takoradi (ISODEC & Oxford America 
2009). 
 
The oil production has been implemented in the following phases: Phase I started 
producing 55,000 barrels per day and about 120 million cubic feet of gas. While in 
Phase II, it is expected to produce 120,000 barrels per day with about 250 million 
cubic feet of gas. It has been estimated that the oil production is to peak between mid 
2012- mid 2017, with life span of about twenty years (PREM 4 Document Africa 
Region 2009).  
 
2.6 The feature of Cape Three Point in Ahanta West District 
 
2.6.1 Location and size  
 
Much of Cape Three Points is not prepared for the influx of Ghanaians and foreigners 
driven by the oil excitement. The communities along Cape Three Points have found 
themselves open up to be overran by influx of people after 2011. Cape Three Point is 
located in the Ahanta West District of the western region of Ghana. The District is 
bounded on the East by the Shama Ahanta East Metropolitan Assembly (SAEMA), 
on the West by the Nzema East District, and the North by Mpohor Wassa East and 
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Wassa West Districts and on the south Gulf of Guinea. The District is characterized 
by double maxima of rainfall in March-July and August-October (about 1,700mm) in 
the year and a relative average humidity of about 75%. It has a total land area of 591 
square kilometers which is occupied by 95,140 people; consists of 48.4 percent males 
and 51.6 percent females. The broad age distribution consists of 42.6 percent under 
fifteen years (0-14); 52.3 percent (15-64 years)- the economically active population, 
and the elderly made up of 5.1 percent.  
Map 6: Ahanta West District 
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Source: Adopted from Ahanta West District Medium Term Development Plan 
(2006:15). 
About 65% of the total population is employed in agriculture. Farming and fishing 
are the major economic activities undertaken in the District. The rest of the populace 
is engaged in small-scale trading, and the government institutions and agencies.  
 
Majority of the population are Christians, with traditionalists and Muslims forming a 
minority in the religious make up of the communities. The widely spoken language is 
Ahanta; while other languages such as Evalue (Egyambra, Princess Town and 
Princess Aketakyi) and Fante (Adjua, Funkoe, New Amanful and Dixcove) are 
associated with the people. There are three (3) paramountcies namely, Busua, Upper 
Dixcove and Lower Dixcove with the chief paramountcy located at Busua.  
 
In sum, the composition of GDP over the 20 year period from 1980-2000 is 
dominated by the agricultural sector, followed by the service and industrial sectors. 
However, the trend changed in 2010 with the service sector contributing 41.6 percent 
to GDP, and agriculture 33.7 percent and industry accounting for 25.7 percent. The 
government private sector growth strategy had seen greater investment into the 
service sector rather than agriculture and industrial sectors of the economy. Infant 
mortality rate decrease from 115 in 2007 to 76 in 2008; literacy rate increased from 
65.02 to 65.82 in 2008; while life expectancy rates increases slightly from 56.5 to 
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56.75 as shown in the table above. The main natural resources include oil and gas, 
gold, diamond, bauxite, manganese, limestone, iron ore, as well as clay and granite 
deposits, with the major export being cocoa and gold. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on natural resources endowment in relation to 
economic growth and development, resource curse and the Dutch Disease, volatility 
of development, institution building, rent-seeking behaviors, political stability and 
development. Emphasis is placed on the relationships between natural resources and 
economic development on one hand and natural resources and quality of life amongst 
people on the other. 
3.1 Growth and Development   
 
The relationship between the natural resource endowment of a country and its 
economic development is not straightforward. The long-run empirical evidence 
shows that the availability of natural resources is not a panacea in economic 
development.  There are examples of resource-rich countries that have grown rapidly 
while others have had only a modest economic performance, for instance, Qatar has 
rapid growth while Nigeria had had modest growth over the past decades.  On the 
other hand, there are examples of countries which despite having less natural 
resources have grown at a spectacular pace. A case in point is Japan and Singapore. 
Classical economists have assigned a very important role to the impact of natural 
resources on the growth potential of an economy. Adam Smith (1981) stresses the 
availability of land as a factor in economic growth. Ricardo and Malthus (1820) were 
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pessimistic about the availability of natural resources for growth. More recent studies 
by Hofman (2001) showed that technological advances have increased the 
productivity of agriculture enormously and that technology and geological 
prospecting have also increased proven reserves and the yield of mineral resources. 
 
Besides these perspectives, Rostow (1961) sees natural resource endowments as a 
means that would enable developing countries to make the transition from 
underdevelopment to industrial “take off”, just as developed countries have done. 
Australia, the United State, and Canada are examples of such „take off‟. Balassa 
(1980); Krueger (1980); Drake (1972) agreed that natural resources could facilitate 
the country‟s industrial development process by providing domestic markets with 
investible funds.  
 
Sachs and Warner (1995) took the study further with empirical evidence on natural 
resources and development. They provided a proof based on cross-sectional analysis 
between 1960 and 1990. According to them economies with a high ratio of natural 
resource export grew more slowly over the 1980s and 1990s than non-resource 
countries. In further categorization of natural resources, Isham (2002), for instance, 
concluded that countries with abundance in a single natural resource grew much more 
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slowly during the 1980s and 1990s than countries that are rich in diffuse natural 
resources.  
Similar proof by Sala-i- Matin and Subramanian (2004) explains that an abundance of 
„point source‟ natural resources was significantly correlated with poor economic 
growth, but that an abundance of diffuse natural resources was not. Expanding the 
argument to include individual natural resource rather than collective one, Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) stated fuel and ores had a more negative effect on growth than 
agriculture. To affirm this assertion, Ross (2003) found that oil wealth and non-fuel 
mineral wealth are associated with bad outcomes for the poor but not agriculture 
resources 
In investigating the relationship between natural resources and social development of 
the people, Davis (1995), for instance, using certain economic and social measures 
shows that mineral economies performed better than non-mineral economies between 
1970 and 1991. These measures include average gross national product (GNP) per 
capita and improved social indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy, calorie 
supply per capita, and human development index.    
On the contrary, some analysts who studied the natural resources and development 
held the view that the outcomes were disappointing. Natural resource exporters suffer 
from declining terms of trade, volatile export earnings, an enclosed economic 
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structure and its effect on efficient resource allocation, rent-seeking behavior, and the 
Dutch disease.  
3.2 Resource curse and the Dutch Disease 
 
Researchers who have measured natural resource wealth in terms of either ratio of the 
countries‟ natural resource export to GDP or the ratio of countries‟ natural resource 
export to total export have shown that there are less apparent and supportive proof of 
the concept of resource curse. Stijns (2001), for instance, found that when natural 
resource wealth was measured in terms of levels of production and reserves, it did not 
establish any significant influence on economic growth.  
 
A number of studies have used non-export-based measures of natural resource 
abundance (Gylfason, 1999 and Auty, 2001), to suggest that the findings of these 
studies may be more robust than critics of the resource curse theory have suggested. 
But the questions of whether these findings are robust to the measurement of natural 
resource abundance remain unanswered. 
Corden (1984) who tries to model this effect put out to show how capital moves away 
from non-oil tradables as oil booms, putting stress on the overall economy. An influx 
of foreign capital to the booming resource sector causes an appreciation in the 
exchange rate. A higher exchange rate raises economy-wide prices, leading to the 
non-resource tradable sectors to lose competitiveness abroad. Therefore, it is 
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indefinite to conclude that the ratio of natural resource exports to GDP or the ratio of 
natural resource exports to total exports are appropriate measures for natural resource 
wealth.   
 
These methodologies did not exclude depreciation in their computations, which make 
Neumayer (2004) suspicious about the results of the various findings. Neumayer 
measured growth in terms of genuine income-GDP minus depreciation rather than 
GDP, the result upheld that natural resources abundance had a negative effect on 
economic growth. This was supported by a number of analysts who provided proof 
that natural resources have negative effect on poverty in relation to World Bank 
indicators of $1.65 or $2 per day (UNCTAD, 2002; Ross, 2003). Similarly, Ross 
(2003) talked about the effects of mineral wealth on poverty using proxy variables 
such as life expectancy, infant mortality and prevalence of child malnutrition. 
Mineral wealth had small negative effects on these variables. 
 
Under certain circumstances, point-source resources such as fuels and minerals 
intensify rent-seeking behavior. Rent-seeking, according to Lane and Tornell (1999), 
leads to vicious fiscal redistribution, inefficient capital projects, and corruption. Lane 
and Tornell identified two main exacerbating traits. The first is the absence of strong 
legal and political institutions. The second is the presence of multiple power groups, 
such as parasitic provincial governments, protection-seeking industrial centers and 
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labor unions, and political patronage networks. These two situations create what Lane 
and Tornell call a “voracity effect,” where a large resource windfall will generate an 
increase in fiscal redistribution that is more than proportionate, thereby reducing 
growth. Guerrilla uprisings in Colombia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Peru, as well as Native American riots in Ecuador, Bolivia, Mexico, and Brazil, are 
examples of voracity effect. 
 
Andrew Rosser (2009:169) argued that most studies attempted to explain the resource 
curse- particularly those conducted by political scientists that the main problem with 
natural resources was not the skewed export structure per se but that it creates rents-
seeking, thus, excess earnings above normal profits. The effect of these rents to 
development outcomes is seen as negative and encourages shortsightedness by 
political elites, promoting damaging rent-seeking behavior, weakening state capacity 
to regulate and supervise the economy, empowering social elements that are opposed 
to growth-promotion policies, or encouraging foreign intervention (Rosser, 2006b).  
It is equally important to recognize that rent provides the basis for making judgments 
about the reality or otherwise of a resource curse. But most of the researchers such as 
Herb (2003); Collier and Hoeffler (2005) have used in their studies which so far 
proved mixed outcomes for the concept of resource curse 
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Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) model shows an underdeveloped country exceeding its 
steady or equilibrium state during a resource boom. After the initial rise in income, 
the growth rate turns negative, and the country converges to its steady state. Resource 
revenues consumed by the domestic economy will naturally decrease over time, 
tending to zero. In this way, after a country enjoys the resource boom, it negatively 
converges to its overshot steady state. Sachs and Warner‟s (2005) empirical evidence 
support this model by finding a negative growth rate associated with natural resource 
abundance only after an increase in initial wealth. 
 
One important implication is that the observed negative growth is simply the 
reversion of the positive growth occurring immediately after the boom. Therefore it is 
a depletion effect, rather than natural resources, that is responsible for the negative 
growth rates. Rodriguez and Sachs show that if an economy instead invests its 
windfall in foreign assets that generate a steady stream of revenue, a negative growth 
rate can be prevented. 
 
3.3 Volatility and development 
 
Humphreys, Sachs, and Stiglitz (2007) narrated the challenges of volatility of natural 
resource abundance and dependence. They observe natural resources as assets with 
exceptional volatility. As the price of natural resource is volatile owing to varying 
rates of extraction and the nature of contracts with multi-national companies, Stiglitz 
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(2007) and Shaxson (2005) suggested that the effect of these contracts arise from 
multinationals coercing economies to bear the impact of the income variability. The 
adverse effects of volatility, amongst other things, include difficulty in making 
development planning, social spending behaviors sporadically and foreign investor 
wariness. 
 
The issues of volatility become more problematic when an economy over depends on 
the natural resource industry for its development activities. Lederman and Maloney 
(2007) showed that a trade structure which lacks export diversification does not 
promote growth. This assertion was tested by Sachs and Warmer (2005) analysis with 
the inclusion of a variable for export concentration and intra-industry trade. The 
findings proved that the negative effect associated with natural resources on growth 
disappeared when export concentration was present in the computation 
 
Most of the natural resource abundant countries are particularly vulnerable to external 
shocks, as a result of weak productive linkages that characterize the economy. 
Hausmann, Rodríguez, and Wagner (2007) show that countries with lower export 
flexibility which they measure by using an indicator of the density of the product 
space developed by Hausmann and Klinger(2006) have a harder time recovering from 
crises caused by export collapses, as it is more difficult for them to move productive 
resources to a new sector. This is particularly important for resource rich countries as 
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many natural resources, such as oil, are found to occupy areas of low density in the 
product space 
 
3.4 Institution and Development 
 
The relationship between institutions and development cannot be overemphasized. 
The study by Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003) shows a direct causal 
relationship between natural resources and weak institutions. They asserted that 
natural resources influence growth indirectly through institutions.  Therefore, there is 
the need for states to have efficient and effective institutions to lead economic 
growth. But Karl‟s analysis on institutions indicates that the major petro-states, 
Nigeria, Algeria, Iran, and Venezuela, had one defining feature: they developed their 
institutions at the same time that petroleum was discovered and multi-national oil 
companies entered these countries.  
 
Further examination by Mehlum (2006) provides that institutional quality and 
construct index based on data from the political risk services further put the 
institutions into two categorize- „Producer friendly‟ and „grabber friendly‟. The 
results show that, controlling for level of education and ethnic fractionalization, the 
resource curse only hits countries with a lower level of institutional quality 
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Over the last decade, most of the blame for poor growth rates in resource dependent 
states has been placed on institutional weaknesses. A number of these explanations 
actually emphasize institutional interactions.  Many have observed that natural 
resources have huge economic benefits for many countries while appearing not to 
have helped, or even possibly to have hurt, other countries, suggesting the existence 
of conditional factors which may be amplifying any effect of natural resources.  
 
3.5 Political stability and development 
 
In finding out whether there was any variation in outcomes across different types of 
resource economies in different regions after examining data from 113 states between 
1971 and 1997, Ross (2001) found that „a state‟s reliance on oil or mineral exports 
tends to make it less democratic; that this effect is not caused by other types of 
primary exports; that it is not limited to the Arabian peninsula, to the Middle East, or 
to sub-Saharan Africa; and that it is not limited to small states (Ross 2001:346). 
This is consistent with Wantcheken (1999)‟s research that a 1 percent increase in 
natural resource dependence, as measured by the ratio of primary exports to GDP, 
increased the probability of authoritarian government by nearly 8 percent. 
On the issue of political instability, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) stated that natural 
resource wealth, defined in terms of the ratio of primary exports to GDP, is a strong 
and significant determinant of the onset of civil war, as it shows curvilinear 
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relationship among the variables of inception, duration, intensity of war, and the 
number of battle-related deaths. In a subsequent study, Collier & Hoeffler (2000) 
upheld the finding by using a better dataset.  In a third study in examining the effect 
of natural resource and civil wars, they indicated that natural resource increased the 
risk of both secessionist and non-secessionist civil wars and that the former were 
three times more likely to be associated with natural resources than latter (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2002).   
 
Another dimension discussed by Reynal-Querol (2002) focused on the difference 
between natural resources and the onset of ethnic and non-ethnic civil wars. Using 
data from a sample of 138 countries between 1960 and 1995, he concluded that 
natural resource abundance was an important variable in explaining the incidence of 
non-ethnic civil wars and other forms of political violence but not incidence of ethnic 
wars. Collier and Hoeffler analysis (2005) shows that natural resources continue to 
exhibit a curvilinear relationship with the onset of civil wars even if a rent-based 
measure of natural resources abundance is substituted for their original export-based 
measure. But, they were quick to add that this result is less significant than their 
earlier finding and that the rent-based measure of natural resource wealth becomes 
significant, when the original measure of natural resource wealth is included in the 
regression analysis. 
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Some have argued that natural resource abundance may also lengthen the duration of 
civil wars. Doyle and Sambanis (2000) showed this in their research, that natural 
resource wealth was significantly and negatively correlated with the success of peace-
building initiatives. Much as there is a link between the failure of such initiative and 
the duration of civil wars, one cannot but accept the view (Ross, 2004:341).  But 
Ballentin (2003) argued from a different perspective; he found that natural resources 
prolong civil wars in a selection of resource-rich developing countries and not in all 
resource rich countries. 
Undoubtedly, the conclusion drawn is for strong institutions that might have direct 
relations with economic growth.  The findings established a strong relationship 
between natural resource wealth and the beginning and duration of civil wars. This, 
however, appears to be subjected to the use of a particular civil war database.  
Scholars who have used alternative lists of civil wars have generally come to 
different conclusions. One can cite several reasons for this state of affairs, which 
include the way civil wars are coded on countries and how civil war duration is 
measured.  
 
In contrast to resource less countries such as Japan and Singapore, land and labour 
played significant role in their economic development. Total land area per square 
kilometer per head in Japan in 1950 was twelve times the level in United State, and 
more than twenty-four times Latin America countries, as showed in the table below. 
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Table 3.1: Total land area per head of population per sq km, 1950-2010 
 
Countries 1950 1994 2010 
Chile 12.3 5.4 0.044 
Venezuela 17.3 4.1 0.032 
Brazil 15.9 5.3 0.044 
Spain   1.8 1.3 0.011 
USA   6.3 3.7 0.030 
Germany   0.5 0.2 0.004 
Japan   0.5 0.3 0.003 
Korea   0.5 0.2 0.020 
Singapore   0.5 0.2 0.00012 
 
Source: FAO, Production Yearbook, Maddison (1995) and Hofman (2001) 
The land size was obviously limited in Japan and Singapore than resource abundant 
countries. However, they have been able to turn the sea into entry port for the purpose 
of trade with the rest of the world. As Adam Smith pointed out, sea transport is much 
cheaper than terrestrial transport which was reason why civilizations and great cities 
are located along the coast, thus increasing the variety of products available.  
 
As a resource less country, with abundance of labor force at its disposal, Japan 
managed to utilize the human resources productively to promote economic growth. 
The labor-driven development led to quicker rise in wages, and hence overall level of 
living standards for workers than resource rich counterparts (Ozawa,1997).  
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In contrast, resource rich countries are associated with dependence on primary 
exports which are subject to low prices in the world market. Natural resource 
exploitation is also subject to diminishing returns, especially on the part of labor, with 
skews income distribution in favor of landowners as against workers who are often 
trapped in poverty. This is not the ideal condition to kick start of industrialization, 
since it‟s often leads to social instability. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
Indeed, many problems exist with regard to dependence on natural resource for 
socioeconomic development. They are extremely diverse in coverage as well as the 
methodology, and have resulted in diverse outcomes. In one occasion, some analysts 
established that natural resource economies performed better than non-natural 
resource economies to improve social indicators of education, health, malnutrition, 
life expectancy, whereas others proved otherwise. This shows uncertainty of the 
findings. With respect to employment, the consensus is that job creation was 
generally insufficient, to match up with the labour force for speedy economic growth 
and social development.  
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On the whole, the literature provided information that natural resources have the 
tendency to slow down economic growth or associated with negative economic 
growth as shown by most scholars on the subject. Thus there is no clear-cut evidence 
to show that natural resource abundance or an abundance of a particular type of 
resources and various development outcomes are correlated with one another. 
Secondly, it exposes the country to the issue of Dutch disease, as influx of foreign 
capital is channeled to the booming resource sector causing an appreciation in the 
exchange rate. A higher exchange rate raises economy-wide prices, leading to the 
non-resource tradable sectors to lose competitiveness abroad.  
Thirdly, most of the scholars emphasized that resource extraction (be it logging, oil 
and gas, mining) often results in economically unstable communities (Fortmann & 
Huntsinger 1989; Freudenburg 1992; Freudenburg & Gramling 1994). For example, 
the issue of Colorado twenty-five years ago, when oil shale boom-bust had created 
economic hardship and social disorder (Gulliford ,1989). And that oil and gas 
industry is associated with more underemployment than other mining activities, 
(Slack and Jensen, 2004). Even though Flint and Luloff (2005) argue that resource-
dependent communities possess adequate social capital (Putnam, (1995), however, 
the community structure to protect themselves from the inherent risks associated with 
natural resource industries, social breakdown are rampant.  
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Finally, the greater economic diversity predicts lower unemployment rates and 
greater employment stability, and that areas with high concentrations of employment 
in unstable industries have higher overall unemployment rates (Malizia & Ke, 1993). 
Therefore in pursuit of oil growing industry is an appropriate short-term strategy for 
economic growth and that Long term stability is possible with policies designed to 
increase economic diversity (Wagner, 2000) 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
This chapter examines the techniques applied to discuss the research questions posed 
in chapter one.   Data sample and size, and the type of data analysis approach adopted 
for discussing the data for the three themes including the Oil Economies; the Concept 
of Dutch disease, the 1973 oil crises and aftermath through to1990s are provided in 
this chapter. The outcome variables of child mortality, life expectancy, literacy rate 
and unemployment have been explained.  
 
4.1. Theory for the Research 
 
For the research to achieve its objectives, the researcher adopted the logical model to 
evaluate the outcomes of oil production in the selected countries. The logical model 
of evaluation is a systematic and objective assessment of policy or program, its 
implementation and results, with the aim to determine its efficiency, effectiveness 
and impact (Miyoshi 2009: 8). In other words, it is a systematic collection and 
assessment of information related to the outcomes, operation or process of a policy 
structure, organization or relationships (Morehouse, 1972; Patton, 2002, Weiss 1998). 
This follows that the investment into oil production would generate activity, leading 
to output, and cause immediate outcomes, which eventually would provide end 
outcomes, as shown in Figure 4.1.  
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Figure 4.1: Logical Model 
 
       
 
    Outcome   Implementation                                                                  
        (Administrative Activities) 
          Results 
           
Source: K. Miyoshi (2009: 11) 
The theory works from right hand side to the left, and at each stage, leaves out an 
effect in the development processes. The figure 4.2 below explains the meaning in 
each stage of activity in the processes. 
Figure 4.2: Indicators and Measurement of Logic Model 
 
Indicator  Measurement   
Input  Financial, human and technical investment  
Activity  Execution of policy/ operation of work 
Output  Results of completed policy/operation of work 
Intermediate 
outcomes 
Immediate change/ direct and indirect effects  
End outcomes Change in society 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
Input  Activities Output Intermediate 
Outcome 
 
End Outcome 
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This is applied on the anthropogenic system of socioeconomic connectivity as a 
means to help fashion the conceptual framework in Figure 1.1 constructed to assess 
the performance outcomes. The system is characterized by inter-connectivity which 
facilitates the process of production, accumulation of capital and distribution of 
wealth.  Thus the underpinning concept of the system is a set of elements connected 
together, which form a whole, rather than properties of its component parts” 
(Checkland 1981:3).  This is illustrated in the figure 4.3 below 
Figure 4.3 Socioeconomic interaction net works in anthropogenic systems. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted from Dirk Helbing 2009: 428 
 50 
 
An impact is an action taken by individual, firm or government which influences a 
change in the lives of the people with respect to politics, economy and society. These 
changes are usually measured in terms of social and economic indicators based on the 
outcomes of policies. In this respect, the research used the following: level of literacy 
rate (% age of 15 year and older), life expectancy, infant and child mortality rate (% 
age under 5 year), and unemployment rate as its end outcomes. In addition, inflation, 
exchange rate, exports are used in the discussion for the process of determining the 
end outcomes of oil production by using the variables stated above.  
 
4.2 Definition of variables for the study 
 
Economic growth is defined as a long-term expansion of the productive potential of 
the economy. Infant and Child mortality refers to the number of infant deaths per 
thousand live births and children under the age of 5 years. It is measured by the total 
number of deaths to children under the age of one year for every 1,000 live births and 
children under the age of five years for every 1000 births. It is used to compare the 
health and well-being of populations across and within countries. 
 
Life expectancy expresses the average number of years a new born person can expect 
to live as they experience the current age-specific mortality rates in the population. It 
is also statistical average, which estimates the equivalent years in full health that a 
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person can expect to live on the basis of the current mortality rates and prevalence 
distribution of health standards in the population. (www.who.int/). 
Literacy rate expresses the percentage of the people who can read and write above 15 
years and older of the total population of the country. Unemployment rate deals with 
the percentage of employable people actively seeking for work, but out of the total 
labor force. 
 
4.3 Data construction  
 
The data constructed for the study was generated from World Bank data, United 
Nations Development Program on human development, Organization of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monitoring Fund financial 
statistics and Asia Development Bank and National Account Statistics of Norway. 
Aspects of statistical information were taken from researchers who have done similar 
work in the oil sector, and were improved by this research.    
 
For an oil economy, data was constructed to cover Algeria, Iran, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Initial migration began in 1921 for Venezuela, 
1950s and 1960s in the case of Indonesia, and 1970s for Qatar. Data was also 
constructed for life expectancy, infant and child mortality, literacy rate, inflation, per 
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capita health expenditure, per capital education expenditure, and employment. The 
sample data size involved 12 oil economies in Africa, Asia, Middle East, Latin 
America and Scandinavia over a period of ten years (1998-2008). 
Data was constructed on three countries- Botswana, Indonesia and Nigeria on the 
sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and service) contributing to total export and GDP 
growth. The data covers 1965 to 2008, to establish the trends exhibited by the 
countries. 
 
The objective for this data constructs was to analyze revenues accrued to some 
selected oil economies, and the impacts this revenue had after 10 years. Data was 
constructed by using 1984 as the base year, and using 1986 and 1988 to determine the 
rates of economic growth over the period.  
 
The purpose of this research is to determine the impacts of natural resources on the 
socioeconomic development of the people. For that matter data was constructed to 
cover 12 countries for both oil and non-oil countries on life expectancy, infant and 
child mortality rate, literacy rate and unemployment for the period 1980 -2008.  
For data in table 5.2 Angola has to be substituted with Gabon to accomplish the 
objective set out by the table.  
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4.4 Data Analysis 
 
The analysis involves qualitative and quantitative methods generated from categories 
of information gathered from the data which was used to construct graph and 
statistical tables. In some cases, the use of quantitative technique gives better 
understanding of the interrelation of variables that are difficult to measure.  The 
second step was that the suitable category was selected and positioned within the 
theoretical framework (Corbin & Strauss, 2007; Corbin & Strauss, 1990, 1998).  
 
The analysis has been divided into three themes for the outcomes of the four 
socioeconomic indicators that were assessed in the selected oil and non-oil 
economies. The themes focused on the impacts of oil production since 1960, the 
concept of the Dutch disease with reference to Botswana, and a comparison with two 
identical oil economies that have similar features-Indonesia and Nigeria; the 1973 oil 
shock which increased the windfall for oil economies. In addition, the research 
offered detailed description of each theme, which was followed by analysis of the 
data for each of the theme.  Of course, all the themes require quantitative trend 
analysis, in particular the complex interrelation of the variable and the different 
regimes of governance among the oil economies. The figure 4.4 below summarizes 
the analysis for the rest of the text. 
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Figure 4.4 Analysis framework 
 
           
           
           
           
           
 Implementation           Degree of Achievement
           
           
           
           
           
      success and failures   
           
     
 
Source: Compiled by the Author  
 
In some occasion in the analysis, reference was made to Iran, Iraq, Brazil, and Peru as 
examples to substantiate the subject under discussion.   
 
4.5 Criteria for selection of countries 
 
Given the aim of the study impacts of oil production on selected oil economies, the 
criteria for the selection was based on the population and GDP per capita in1960 and 
2008, as shown in Table 4.1 
Normative analysis of 
performance outcomes 
Descriptive analysis of the 
policy implemented and 
supported with data 
Recommendation 
 
Lesson learnt and comparison with the features of Ghana 
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Table 4.1Criteria for country selection 
 
Country Population 
1960 
Population 
2008 
GDP 
1980 
GDP 
2008 
% 
change 
GDP 
Qatar        45,000        824,789 - 77,178 - 
U A E        90,234     4,765,000 10,328 58,462 466.1 
Norway   3,580,998     4,843,000 30,860 58,714 90.3 
S. Arabia   4,074,732   25,520,000 37,581 24,504 -34.8 
Angola   5,012,000   17,310,000 -   5,820 - 
Venezuela   7,578,904   28,610,000 12,507 12,818 2.5 
Chile   7,643,274    16,980,000   5,809 14,432 148.4 
Malaysia   8,140,405   24,821,286   5,296 14,215 168.4 
Algeria 10,800,000   34,460,000   6,884   8,036 16.7 
Nigeria 35,000,000 151,810,000   1,806   2,099 16.2 
Mexico 36,939,890 107,550,000 11,304 14,570 28.9 
Indonesia 93,996,000 228,580,000   1,474   3,994 170.9 
 
Source: UN Human Development Indicator 2010; World Development  
Indicators Database 2008 and CIA World Fact book 2010 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
i.  The data construction for some of the oil producing economies is difficult to 
obtain for the analysis, especially data for 1960 to 1980. This has affected the 
consistency of the data analysis. Thus some of the data began from 1965 
while others are from the 1970s and the 1980s. 
ii. As may be found in the data, Angola was substituted with Gabon in table 5.2 
for lack of data to accomplish the purpose of the study.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ANALYSIS OF THE THEMES 
 
The chapter examines the impact of oil production on the selected economies under 
the three themes proposed in Chapter one. The first theme discusses the impacts of oil 
with respect to oil production and migration, and agriculture, and land disputes. The 
second theme explains the concept of Dutch disease, where Botswana, Indonesia and 
Nigeria were selected to discuss the Dutch disease. The third theme deals with the 
1973 to 1990s period of oil production in selected oil countries in Latin America, 
Middle East, Asia, and Africa. A summary to conclude the chapter is provided at the 
end. 
 
   5.1 Impacts on an Oil Economy  
 
The socioeconomic impact of oil production on the nation and the community at large 
cannot be underestimated. Tinker Salas (2009) indicated that wherever oil companies 
engaged in extractive processes, they tend to repeat certain patterns of socioeconomic 
and cultural development outcomes. Oil production easily alters and reshapes the 
existing physical environment and gives rise to new settlements as the operations 
expand in larger scale, the impact no longer is limited to the area of operation.  It 
spreads to every aspect of the country, directly or indirectly, influencing the 
socioeconomic and the cultural life of the people. It also has the tendency to break 
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down regional barriers and change the way host communities define space and their 
lives, giving different outlooks to the existing economic and social linkages between 
the new oil producing communities and the rest of the country.      
 
5.1.2 The relationship between oil production and migration 
 
As the literature shows, we can agree that there is direct relation between oil 
production and migration. Domingo Alberto Rangel (Los andinos en el poder, 207) 
made a representation in a study that migration in Venezuela mostly occurred in both 
internal and external migration. Internally, migration occurred in densely populated 
states. In the case of external migrants, they migrated from the United States, Britain, 
France, China and India, and were driven by the extraction of oil.  Communities such 
as Lara and Trujillo for example, in the early stages of oil production, were found to 
be densely populated with each of them having 219,000 and 178,942 respectively in 
1921 (Salas, 2009).  
Similarly, Indonesia‟s population in East Kalimantan (especially Marangkayu 
district) was said to be overrun by immigrants, mainly from China, Vietnam, 
Philippines, and India, after independence in the 1950s and the early 1960s (Tri Nuke 
Pudjiastuti 2002). Saudi Arabia attracted migrant workers from Egypt, Vietnam, 
India, China, United State and Britain to the oil communities in Shay bah and Botha 
oil fields. In Qatar, 65 percent of 111,113 were immigrants in 1970 (Metz 2002); 
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South Asians (mainly Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, and Filipinos) made up 
about 35 percent of the population; Qataris, 20 percent; Arabs, 25 percent; Iranians, 
16 percent; and others, 4 percent. Niger Delta of Nigeria hosted migrants from other 
West African countries.  
These migrants not only on account of  seeking employment in the oil field but other 
sectors, including seeking economic and social linkages that is provided by the 
Province, District or the communities in the mining enclave. These large migratory 
circuits bring in new cultural practices which reinforce formal and informal ties 
between provincial, district, the oil communities on one hand and the rest the country 
on the other. 
As oil and its related activities become expanded, labour migrates from agricultural 
and industrial sectors into the oil industry for better wages. Consequently, agriculture 
and industry are undermined, given rise to labour shortage and less output and less 
expansion and eventually slow economic growth. This creates one- path commodity 
export and economic growth, though such an export reduces the economic power of 
the traditional communities. The communities tend to the oil industry for non-existing 
jobs, which demands high skills. Thus „more labour chasing fewer jobs‟, as a result 
labour wage decreases, leading to the reduction in the standard of living. 
Consequently, social problems such as gangsters, prostitution, abortion, infanticide, 
divorce and remarriage as normal, homosexuality, adultery and public entertainment 
full of violent and licentious performances and so forth escalates, making it difficult 
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for community cohesion. This pattern is repeated in most African oil economies, for 
many years. 
However, in the case of Norway, the economy was not spoiled by one path of 
economic activity but maintains multiple forms of economic activities such as 
agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, mineral extraction, iron ore, services. Alan 
Milward (1992), maintained that the industrial revolution created an industrial sector, 
a very modern and prosperous sector within the framework of a much poorer and 
more traditional agricultural sector which had remained an important branch of the 
economy.  Agriculture, fishing and forestry were the traditional occupations of the 
peasantry, which is the largest employer of the labour force in the country. These 
occupations accounted for one-third of the total employment in Norway. Social 
structures and policies put in place before the process of industrialization began 
probably made negative social effects less effective. 
 
Most oil developing economies started off with massive state-led developmental 
programs for growth and modernization. They adopted national industrialization 
programs in large scope, and funded ambitious social and economic projects at the 
same time. These investments though varied from country to country had little effect 
in respect of economic growth. Iran for instance, not only focused on heavy industry, 
but also made huge investments into military expansion (Chaudhry 1999:317-42; 
Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1977/2001:216-54). Saudi Arabia embarked upon broad 
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based program of bureaucratic and infrastructure development, modernization of the 
economic, social and military spheres (Chaudhry 1997:65-100, 135-85). Algeria 
started with capital intensive industries, whereas Indonesia undertook some sort of 
balanced growth with attention to the rural and urban development of the economy 
and administrative machinery (Booth 1999; Campos & Root 1996:64-7). 
In assessing all these developmental programs, Norway, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia 
were driven towards addressing social problems, because they tackled somewhat the 
needs of the countryside and the cities and aimed to achieve food security, 
administrative effectiveness and pursuit of macroeconomic stability. The programs 
(Gelb et al 1988:203-4) addressed the fundamental problems that promote orderliness 
in the economy through distribution of relatively fair and equitable oil revenue to 
sectors that enhance growth and development.. Indonesian government built the 
capacity of the institutions to enhance speedy and easy access to information (Smith 
2007:129-32). It adopted a slogan “development, stability and equality”, and 
effectively managed their inter- relationships which appealed to the public in general.  
 
Iran, Algeria, and Nigeria ignored the rural areas and destabilized the socioeconomic 
conditions of the rural population. The effects were not only in the short run but also 
in the long run as well. Algeria took bold steps to undertake land reform to 
redistribute the land among the peasant farmers, and organized the farmers into 
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cooperatives with government support. However, the cooperatives were not 
supported as intended by the government, and most of the farmers were thrown out of 
business and compelled to search for menial jobs for their livelihood.  
The land reform in Iran rather weakened the power of the traditional landed elite 
which included the Shi‟a clergy, and brought about the concentration of land in the 
hands of the peasantry and thoroughly bureaucratized the rural economy (Lowi 
2009). Although tensions ensued between the state and the clergy, the government 
could not resolve the disputes especially in the oil communities. In addition, farmers 
were not supported with fertilizers, insecticides, machinery or subsidies to cushion 
them against high cost of living brought about by oil production. Agriculture was no 
longer attractive and viable to the farmers, which led to rural-urban migration. Thus 
most of the rural population (majority of them landless peasant farmers) migrated to 
other urban areas. Consequently, social and economic problems of the migrants 
became deepened and unbearable, which complicated the poverty situation in the 
urban centres.  
 
In the case of Venezuela, land reform was unprecedentedly grabbed by oil companies 
and regional elites, which caused dislocation of small and medium sized local 
enterprises (Salas 2009). This action led to reorganization of physical space, which 
threw away small and medium scale enterprises out of business. Thus the land reform 
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presented modest adjustments in Venezuela‟s land tenure system through the 1990s. 
These factors, combined with the fact that large private tracts of land remained intact 
in the hands of a few, compounded the problems in the agricultural sector. Over the 
period, agriculture entered into a steady decline as the oil industry over shadowed all 
other sectors of the economy.   
 
5.1.3 The reasons behind sectoral performance  
 
Countries, such as Algeria and Iraq (in the 1980s), redistributed their oil revenue in 
hierarchical fashion where military and government cronies had greater access to oil 
revenues than the whole country. The redistribution in Algeria was done by 
„exclusion and marginalization‟ of certain social categories. For example, Barbers 
(minority tribe) were excluded from Algeria‟s nation, whereas religious traditionalists 
were co-opted by the state. Shi‟a minority received severe discrimination in 
economic, social and cultural sectors.  
Saudi Arabia subsidized wide range of consumer goods and utilities as a means to 
cushion the people from economic hardship. In addition, it also set up cradle-to-grave 
social welfare programs‟ such as pension and social security benefits, public 
employment, free education and healthcare and scholarships. Social welfare programs 
were available to all the citizens; „one could only determine distributional differences 
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in the area of contracts and gifts, which were accessible to some people‟, (Lowi, 
2009).  
In Venezuela, oil companies backed the government of Vicente Gomez but did little 
in the area of social investment due to relatively weak state institutions unable to 
implement social programs. Government functions were taken up by oil companies 
not only in the local level but at state and national level in the provision of 
infrastructure development including roads, sanitation, water and electrical works, as 
well as social investment in schools, sports, churches and health facilities, which 
provided access to the communities. 
In a nut shell, the impacts of oil production on the countries are not solely negative, 
but have positive impacts. Oil industry attracts migrants (both internal and external) 
into the oil field and introduces new culture into the host communities. It also 
strengthens formal and informal ties amongst the people not only seeking for 
employment but seeking for opportunities that the communities offered them. The 
successful adjustment of the industrial structure for its comparative advantage in 
Norway implies that rich endowments of natural resources {especially of oil and 
gas}, may have been important for the achievement of high standard of living.  
However, as pointed out above, it is hard to identify such level of development in 
developing oil economies. Then the performance of the Norwegian economy and 
economic policy since 1970 after oil discovery may have to be discussed, based on 
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more or less clear answers to the counterfactual question: what would Norway have 
looked like without oil? Nevertheless, several scholars conclude that petroleum 
wealth has been a blessing rather than a curse to Norwegian economy (Torvik 2007; 
Roed Larsen 2003). 
Many oil economies in Latin America, Middle East, Asia and even in Africa have had 
some level of successes based on what seemed to be rightful decisions made in 
investing on the socioeconomic development of the population. Social and economic 
developments are inseparable. Countries that diversify their economies with service-
led growth such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore and Japan, for example, 
have had high GDP per capita, than the resource dependent Saudi Arabia, Mexico 
and Nigeria.  
 
5.2 The Concept of the Dutch Disease in oil Economies 
 
The literature on resource curse establishes the relationship between natural resources 
wealth and development outcomes as negative. This is because resource rich 
countries have performed poorly in developmental terms. Countries with less 
endowed natural resources that continue to show strong transformation in their 
societies through sound economic policies, particularly in macroeconomic and fiscal 
management. The natural resources dependent countries have not shown such a 
successful transformation.   
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The causes of the poor performance of natural resource rich countries are linked to 
other factors. Rosser‟s (2006) research findings concluded that the causal mechanism 
linking natural resource wealth and poor development outcomes is attributed to 
economic factors. This is because natural resource exporters suffer from decline in 
terms of trade, volatile export earnings, an enclosed economic structure and the Dutch 
disease. 
The „Dutch disease‟ explains the apparent relationship between the exploitation of 
natural resource and the decline of the manufacturing sector combined with moral 
fallout. It emphasizes the condition whereby a resource boom leads to appreciation of 
the exchange rate and makes the manufacturing and other tradable sector less 
competitive and entangles business interests in investing into the economy. Most of 
these resource rich economies in Africa, Middle East and Latin America suffered 
from the Dutch disease. However, some countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Botswana have overcome it and managed to provide both rapid economic growth and 
a certain level of social development. 
 
5.2.1 How Botswana Overcame the Dutch Disease 
 
According to Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001), Botswana government adopted what it refers 
to as sound economic policies and provided good management of its revenues from 
diamond sales. The government set up a stability fund and saved all the accumulated 
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revenue in foreign reserves, ran budget surpluses, and put in place policy guidelines 
as to what, how, and when the accumulated revenue is to be spent. The revenue was 
to be spent during difficult periods in social development rather than deficit 
financing. Moreover, the government managed the nominal exchange rate, aligned it 
with the South Africa Rand to prevent appreciation of the national currency. The 
economy was diversified, at the same time; as economic measures were put in place 
to avoid external debt.  
 
The above measures provided the basis for Botswana‟s economic growth. Figure 5.1 
shows sectoral contribution to GDP growth. It follows that the period between 1970-
90, shows contribution of mining to GDP increase. It shows continuous rise until it 
reached its highest level in 1990. Then it started to fall rapidly between 1990-92, after 
which it leveled off but fell marginally to reach a minimum level in 1999. It rose 
again to reach about 35 percent in 2003.  
 
The services sector performance fell from the beginning of 1978 to 1990, when there 
was intense drive for the promotion of the mining sector to lead the economic growth. 
The curve started to increase, at the period of economic diversification with service 
sector-led growth strategy, which gives rise to about 60 percent contribution to GDP 
growth in 1999. It fell slightly afterwards to about 58 percent in 2003. Agriculture 
and manufacturing sectors contribution were relatively low and remained constant 
from 1985 to 2003, as shown in the figure 5.1 below 
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Figure 5.1 Sectoral Percentage Share of GDP & Annual Growth Rates 1966-
2003, Botswana. 
 
Source: National Accounts Statistics of Botswana – 1974/75 to 1994/95 and 1993/94 
– 2002/03 (Central Statistics Office, Gaborone, March 2000, & September 2000) 
 
At this juncture, it is important to establish the real effects of agriculture, 
manufacturing and service sectors on aggregate GDP growth to ascertain the impact 
on the economy. Figure 5.2 shows the trend of sectoral contribution to GDP which 
excludes the mining sector to total GDP (aggregate)  
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Figure 5.2: Total GDP (aggregate) GDP excluding Mining, Botswana. 
 
 
Source: National Accounts Statistics of Botswana – 1974/75 to 1994/95 and 1993/94 
– 2002/03 (Central Statistics Office, Gaborone, March 2000, & September 2000) 
 
It is clear from figure 5.2 that during the period on mining-led economic growth, the 
three sectors were neglected almost completely with growth rate of less than 5 
percent. However, the three sectors grew rapidly after 1993, when government 
diversified the economy and pursue service-led economic growth strategy. Since 
then, the three sectors contributed significantly to GDP growth. Two factors have 
been associated with Botswana successes - direct and indirect factors. The direct 
factors were the adoption of good macroeconomic policies and strong protection of 
property rights. Botswana adopted strong institutions and good policies after 
independence and made the people to develop strong interest in these institutions and 
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policies. The indirect factor was the existence of traditional institutions that 
encouraged broad-based participation. Prior to the beginning of the mineral 
development, the state started building effective and efficient institutional structures 
to facilitate the process of development in all sectors of the economy. By and large 
Botswana overcame the Dutch disease, as a result of building strong institutions, 
adopting macroeconomic stability, diversifying the economy and having transparent 
and accountable governance. 
 
5.2.2 Oil economies and the Dutch disease 
 
Indonesia and Nigeria adopted different approaches to the issue of the Dutch disease. 
The approach adopted by Indonesia enabled it to overcome the Dutch disease. Indeed, 
Indonesia performed better on the score of managing the oil resources better than 
Nigeria. Bevan et al (1999)‟s study of the two countries‟ developmental activities 
found that between 1960 and the 1990s the condition and hardship of their people had 
compelled the regimes at that time to adopt different economic models to respond to 
the political, economic and social structures. Between 1950 to the 1980s, Indonesia 
experienced turbulent period with food production, which compelled the government 
to import rice to supplement local production. However, Suharto regime overturned 
the food deficit, when the government shifted attention to the development of 
agriculture to increase production and create employment for the populace; he 
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redefined the role of the military, to perform both social activities and military tasks 
for the state. As a result, Indonesia attained self-sufficiency in rice production by the 
early 1980s (Booth: 1999:114). Thus government took proactive steps to respond to 
the needs of the poor.  
 
On the other hand, Nigeria failed to diversify the economy from over dependence on 
the capital intensive oil sector which provided 20 percent of GDP, 97.5 percent of 
foreign earning and about 81 percent of government revenue (Wokoro, 2010: 328). In 
addition, subsistence agriculture did not keep pace with the rapid population growth. 
Furthermore, Nigeria allowed the army to stick to their core business of military 
activities and resorted to importation of food items to supplement subsistence 
production.  Figure 5.4 shows the sectoral trend for Nigeria. 
 
Second, Indonesia liberalized the economy with Chinese businessmen dominating the 
front of commercial activities, though exposing the country to some sort of 
socioeconomic instability. Nigeria, was dominated by businessmen within the 
country mostly from the south, and due to their dominance, majority of the elites 
feared that economic liberalization would undermine their position by enriching 
southern businessmen and hence their political opponents in the south.  
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On the other hand the ruling elites in Indonesia had no similar concerns about 
economic liberalization because of the presence of Chinese businessmen not only in 
the oil industry but also in manufacturing sector of the economy. For this reason the 
two countries political regimes adopted different approaches in relation to economic 
liberalization.  
Over time economic liberalization enabled Indonesia to stand up to the threat 
imposed by the Dutch disease. Figure 4.3 shows the trend of export composition from 
1965-1999 
Figure 5.3: Sectoral export to GDP -1965-1999, Indonesia 
  
Source: Indonesia Ministry of Finance Bulletin (2000) 
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Figure 5.4: Exports to aggregate GDP, 1970-2005, Nigeria 
 
Source: World Bank 2007 
Comparing the two nations, we can attribute three factors to the success of Indonesia 
over Nigeria: first, President Sukarno declared his vision to foster socioeconomic 
integration with political will during the 1950s and 1960s; and developed strong 
economic infrastructure in the mid 1960, which resulted in rapid economic growth. 
These fundamental features marked the beginning of poverty reduction in Indonesia. 
Nigeria did not show such commitment, to socioeconomic integration and 
infrastructure development during the period.  
The second attribute is the case where Indonesia attached great importance to avoid 
higher inflation after 1971 as compared to Nigeria which had high inflation above 30 
percent between 1985 and 1995. The disperse graph in figure 4.5 shows the level of 
inflation from 1971 to 1995 between the two countries 
 73 
 
Figure 5.5: Inflation rates between 1970 -1995 for Nigeria and Indonesia. 
 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics & CBN Bulletins &  
Wing Thye Woo &Chang Hong, (2009). 
The third attribute was the creation of greater trade and foreign investment 
opportunities for Indonesia than for Nigeria because of the former‟s greater 
geographical proximity and historical ties to Japan and the East Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs). 
 
Indonesia also took advantage of its closeness to Japan to adopt, which seemed to be 
the right decisions to open up the economy for growth. Accordingly, Indonesia 
changed its economic policies from closed structure to capitalist economic 
development between 1970s and 1980s. This paved the way for macroeconomic and 
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fiscal discipline; infrastructure and agriculture development and the pursuit of 
exchange rate policy suitable to maintain international competitiveness in tradable 
commodities rather than oil and gas. 
 
In addition, Indonesia received large amount of foreign aid, took advantage of access 
to European market, to access new technology not only to the agriculture sector but 
also to other sectors. Above all, it attracted huge foreign direct investment to the 
manufacturing sector during 1980s and 1990s. This actually prepared the ground for 
Indonesia to avoid commodity boom, and keep foreign debt abate and able to 
diversifying the economy.  
 
Although one cannot run away from the corruption during the Suharto regime, the 
case of Nigeria was worse. The formula for the distribution of oil revenue made 
politicians to indulge in corrupt practices. 53 percent was allocated to Federal State, 
30% -state governments, 10% local governments and 5%- special Fund (Augustine & 
Anigboh (1998:179). The effect was that oil producing communities had little oil 
benefits from the billions of dollars generated in oil production. Political leaders 
could get away with large sums of money in their personal account‟, Sani Abacha 
(the former military leader) diverted $4 billion to his personal account during his five 
years rule (Wokoro, 2010: 328-330).  
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In sum, Indonesia and Botswana, provided sound economic management, developed 
the institutions and diversified the economy. They much relied on the other sectors 
rather than the mining sectors alone for economic growth and gave way for 
socioeconomic development in their societies. Indonesia, took inspiration from Japan, 
Taiwan, and Hong Kong in Asia to shape up its economy, whereas Botswana 
invested all the diamond‟s revenue in foreign bonds and security to create revenue 
stability. 
 
5.3 The oil price shock of 1973 
 
The period 1973 to 1990 is an important period in the history of oil economies across 
the world, dictated by the quest to amass wealth from the sale of oil. It was 
engineered by OPEC members who used their control over oil production and 
influence in the world price setting to increase world oil prices. The oil shocks 
accorded oil developing economies to record high economic growth rates in 1973, 
Saudi Arabia grew by 19.7 percent, Mexico 8.4 percent; Algeria 8.5 percent; 
Indonesia 11.3 percent and Nigeria 9.5 percent. It was regarded as sterling and 
successful performance by these economies, which influenced the introduction of 
new economic strategies to improve the socioeconomic lives of their citizens. The 
successive increase in oil revenue during the period accorded countries to embark 
upon broad programs for reconstruction and development.  
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For example, in the period 1974-1985, Venezuela received huge increase in 
government revenue as a result of oil windfalls. This created a good condition for 
Venezuela  to maintain relatively high levels of physical and human capital 
investment in the context of a relatively accountable long-standing democratic polity 
(Abramowitz, 1986) for rapid catch-up (Di John, 2004: 17-23) 
 
Algeria committed itself to the development of social justice, industrialization and 
building of infrastructure. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, embarked upon massive 
infrastructure development across the country; all these initiatives were geared 
towards improving the well being of the people. The immediate effect on revenue 
mobilization was tremendous over the period, as shown in Table 5.1 between 1973-
75. 
 
Table 5.1: Oil revenue of Selected countries (US$ billions) 
 
Country/Year 1972 1973 1975 
Algeria 0.7 -   3.4 
Indonesia 0.4 -   3.9 
Iran 2.4 4.1 18.5 
Kuwait 1.7 1.9   7.5 
Libya 1.6 2.3   5.1 
Nigeria 1.2 2.0   6.6 
Saudi Arabia 3.1 5.1 25.7 
Venezuela 1.9 2.8   7.8 
 
Source: Compiled from Philip (1994:153,173) and Lowi (2009: 89) 
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The oil shock was crucial for oil economies, which presented new opportunities for 
development in terms of policy direction, building of institution and distribution of 
accumulated wealth. The record inflow of revenue to these countries led to oversized 
government and ambitious public spending. Benefits of this spending in the short run 
included a massive expansion of public welfare, an increase in employment, and a 
rise in the standard of living. Countries in the Middle-East offered free healthcare, 
education, and extensive pensions, while countries in Latin American invested in job 
creation and subsidized housing and fuel. These unrestrained capital spending 
embarked upon received negative responses almost immediately. There were 
problems with the production system, limited capacity in management and 
infrastructure, inefficiencies, and rising domestic prices.  
 
The economic consequences were apparent, appreciation of domestic currency and 
unprecedented levels of state spending produced Dutch Disease effects. Local 
industry deteriorated, making the states even more dependent on petroleum. The 
government expenditures quickly outpaced the massive oil revenues while income 
remained high. Foreign capital was easily accessible for the first time due to 
countries‟ rent-derived collateral, which led to a huge debt overhang.  
 
The effect of the oil price shock on Algeria for instance was conspicuous, total 
government revenue declined from 44 percent in 1986 to 24 percent in mid 1990 
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when the economy maintained its negative growth rate (Aissaoui 2001:10; Amuzegar 
1999:235). There were severe socioeconomic dislocations facilitated by high 
inflation, high unemployment, and shortage of essential goods, which resulted in anti-
government riots in 1988 (Lowi 2009: 88-92). 
 
Many of these countries found themselves in a similar situation, as the price of oil fell 
by 75 percent, over a period of several months. Governments became unstable, from 
the highest importer, the United State, to least developed countries such as Nigeria 
and Angola. The immediate solution was to amend spending pattern and develop 
programs to ensure macroeconomic stability, and to mitigate social effects created by 
fiscal indiscipline. Across the oil producing states, the capabilities to manage the 
crises were diverse, if we consider the countries on individual bases. 
 
Table 5.3 assesses the GDP at constant price, GDP per capita purchasing power 
parity and the percentage change that had occurred over ten years after the price 
shocks, using 1984 as the base year.  
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Table 5.2: GDP at constant price, GDP per capita purchasing power parity and 
percentage change from the base year 1984 
 
Country 1984 (based 
year) 
1986 1988 
 GDP( 
constant 
2000 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2000 
GDP( 
constan
t 2000 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2000 
% 
Chang
e 
GDP(
PPP) 
GDP( 
consta
nt 
2000 
GDP 
(PPP) 
2000 
% 
Chang
e GDP 
(PPP) 
Algeria 1,956  5,894    1,918   5,751  -2.43 1,785 5,417  -8.09 
Gabon 4,791  6,937    4,353   6,367  -8.23 3,813 5,577 -19.61 
Indonesia    467  1,752      494   1,839  4.97    534 1,978 12.89 
Malaysia 2,161  4,820    2,051   4,572  -5.14 2,257 4,973   3.17 
Mexico 5,016  7,904   4,754   7,496  -5.16 4,712 7,288  -7.79 
Nigeria    298     679      317      754 11.05    327    739   8.80 
S. Arabia 10,453 13,616    9,403 11,853 -12.94 8,817  11,231 -17.52 
UAE 34,846 33,352 23,643 22,540 -32.40 21,923  20,749 -37.79 
 
Source: Compiled from World Bank database and Lowi (2009) 
 
Evaluating countries on an individual basis, of the eight countries sampled, two 
countries, Indonesia and Nigeria, have positive percentage change for both 1986 and 
1988. Malaysia began with negative 5 percent GDP per capita but managed to turn 
the negative to positive 3.17 in the two -year period. The rest of the countries left out 
negative GDP per capita for their economies.  Some countries failed to manage the 
socioeconomic conditions prevailing at that time and had to experience regime 
change, whereas others who handled the crises well successfully carried out 
economic reforms to create social and political stability.  Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and 
Unite Arab Emirates became relatively stable. Nigeria, even though received positive 
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percentage change in GDP, became unstable, and Babangida led-military toppled an 
elected Buhari regime in 1986. The question that needs further investigation is what 
allows some nations to manage their affairs so well in the mists of the oil crises and  
not to degenerate into chaos and insurgency?  Does a regime make a difference in 
terms of developing the welfare of the people?  
 
The answer to this puzzle is not straight forward, in taking critical study of these 
economies. Nigeria, for example, experienced political instability in 1979 on the 
heels of social and economic problems culminating the regime breakdown. Indonesia, 
in 1998, was also hit by currency crisis, which created political instability, even 
though it stood well against the oil shocks. In terms of the outcomes, Indonesia had 
positive outcomes. 
Mexico experienced upheaval in 1994 when the insurgency in Chiapas province 
rioted against the regime following economic hardship, which led to regime change. 
By the end of 1994, Mexican government devalued the peso by 15.3 percent (Andre 
Hofman 2000) and pledged the country into economic crises. The response to the 
policy was immediate; GDP per capita fell over 8 percent in the following year while 
inflation soared closely to 50 percent. 
Mexico enjoyed the benefits of increased oil revenues in the late 1970s, inflation 
accelerated in 1982 and 1983 when oil revenue declined considerably, which forced 
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the government to commit to borrowing loans to supplement the revenue shortfall. 
Such a policy brought the expansion of external deficit and compelled the 
government to resort to deficit financing and sharp exchange rate depreciations. At 
the beginning of 1982, the debt crisis increased to the extent that the Minister of 
Finance had to flow to Washington to announce that Mexico could not fulfill its debt 
obligations (Hofman 2000). 
In 1983, the Mexican government introduced ambitious privatization program to 
inject capital into the economy, sold state-owned enterprises, and left out few in the 
hands of government. As part of measures to turn the economy around, the 
government initiated economic stabilization reform program which consisted of fiscal 
reform, cautious exchange rate policy, a plan to deregulate, modernize and open up 
the economy, and social programs which resulted in comprehensive social agreement 
with the citizens at large.   
The outcomes of these initiatives were positive, according to Hofman (2000), 
inflation went down, with average economic growth rate of 1.1 percent per capita on 
1989-94, current trade balance started showing up from deficits, and increase in 
foreign direct investment. 
 
The effect of the 1973 oil price shock on Venezuela‟s economy was characterized by 
political peace and economic prosperity as compared to some neighboring oil 
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countries which experienced prolonged and debilitating guerrilla conflicts and the 
legacy of military brutality.   
 
Awash with oil revenue, the government funded impressive mega-projects, new 
economic ventures and expanded the existing bureaucracy.  The resultant effect was 
that there was tremendous growth in the middle class across the country, which 
impacted positively on the other sectors of the economy.  
 
In the turn of 1976, the government of Carlos Andres Perez introduced 
nationalization policy with the aim of cutting down the growing monopolistic power 
of the oil industry, but, this failed miserably.  It did not have much or alter everyday 
lives of the state and the Venezuelans, putting the nation into difficult situation to 
meet its social problems faced by the majority of its citizens 
 
Venezuela was hit with debt crises as a result of negative GDP growth recorded in 
five successive years at the beginning of 1980s, whilst GDP per capita fell over 8 
percent at the end of 1983 in the second half of 1980s, the country recovered 
somewhat upon the implementation of severe adjustment and stabilization program 
which was designed to reduce macroeconomic imbalances that caused GDP to fall by 
8 percent and led to social upheaval. When the austerity measures were relaxed to 
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include social programs, early 1990s saw a strong recovery of the economy with GDP 
growth rate of well above 5 percent recorded over the period (Salas 2009).   
However, the problems persisted (economic, social and political instability) over 
time, which caused wide fluctuation in economic performance. The recession which 
started in 1993 became worst in 1994, fuelled by a crises in the financial system.  It 
compelled the government to opt for the revision of the liberalization policy adopted 
in 1989. Among the many problems faced by Venezuela there were the consistently 
huge budget deficits and the continued delay of necessary fiscal and tax reforms.   
 
Algeria was ill prepared to face the challenges of the crisis, especially social conflicts 
arising from over stretched social amenities such as water and sanitation, congestion 
in houses, increased crime activities and food shortages. The institutional mechanism 
to address these problems were completely lacking, giving political leaders the 
heyday to mismanage the oil revenue.  The assertion by Rodrik (1999) that  
„environment where societal cleavages remain deep, while institutions are brittle, 
narrow, and poorly equipped to manage social conflicts that derive from deep 
divisions, oil or non oil exporting state is prone to become unstable in the aftermath 
of a shock that triggers a crises of distribution‟ 
Social groups which were economically poor and excluded in the allocation of oil 
revenues were not integrated into the nation-state, thus they were hardly hit by the 
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crises. The country‟s agrarian reform (program) aiming to achieve improved food 
production was a miserable failure. Large landholdings and redistributed plots were 
egalitarian among the peasant farmers, and were forced into cooperatives without any 
support. Productivity could not increase from the average of 3.2 percent per annum 
recorded in the 1970 (Goumeziane, 1994:56-61), but rather showed continuous 
decline. As agricultural production failed to keep pace with population growth, the 
need for food imports intensified (Swearingen 1992: 127). Food self-sufficiency 
became an illusion to the Algeria. Government was eventually compelled to import 
more than 60 percent of its food needs to supplement subsistence production by the 
end of the 1970s. 
The five year development plans launched in 1980 could not receive the needed 
financial support. The plan sought to improve state management of the economy and 
society in general, with the aim to protect the non-renewable oil endowment, reduce 
dependency on the hydrocarbon sectors and reorient development away from heavy 
industry and towards other neglected sectors such as agriculture, consumer goods and 
social services (Entelis 1988:49). Moreover, the reforms also decentralized and de-
concentrated economic decision making and created independence of the huge SOEs 
that had dominated the economy in the 1970s (Philip 1994: 174-91). The private 
sector activities increased slightly due to uncertainty of property rights and rule of 
law. As a result, investors were cautious about the security of their investment after 
more than a decade of nationalization and anti-capitalist rhetoric.  
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In contrast, Norway set up Government Pension Fund (Act of June 22, 1990, No 36) 
into which the Central government‟s net cash flow from petroleum operations was 
transferred in its entirety and provided a good management tool for petroleum and 
gas industry.  By the end of 2006, the GPF had accumulated a total amounted of 82 
percent of GDP (Holmoy 2009: 195). 
 
This achievement came not only by the revenue transferred to the fund, but it was 
accompanied by guidelines for prudent management. The Government sets up the 
GPF framework with guidelines to curtail rent seeking behavior by politicians, with 
more attention on the expansion of social programs. According to Eriksen (2006:7), 
the guidelines spelt out among other things include the expected real return on the 
Fund.  It means that the Fund serves as a long-term savings for the Norwegian 
Government to accumulate financial assets to help cope with future expenditures that 
would be demanded by an ageing population. The flow chart below shows the 
summary of the guidelines for the management of the GPF. 
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Figure 5.6: The operation of the government Pension Fund-Global. 
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Source: Adopted from Tore Eriksen, (2006:7) 
 
 
According to Erling (2004:189), cited from Financing social policy in Norway shows, 
that the share of government consumption in total increased for social service from 
about 24 percent of GDP in 1970 to about 33 percent in 2000 (see Figure 5.7).  
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Figure 5.7: Composition of total consumption 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004) and Erling Holmoy (2009) 
 
The trend was driven by the increase in individual services provided and finances by 
the government, including health, social care for the elderly and the disabled 
(55percent in 2001) primary schools (17 percent), and colleges, universities and other 
education (21 percent), whilst the public consumption in relation to infrastructure 
development, public institutions financing remained relatively constant.  
 
The increase in the government consumption of individual services is attributed to 
increase in both service standards (measured by man-hours per user) and coverage 
ratios (the number of users relative to the total number of individuals in specific age 
 88 
 
groups).The local government provides most of the welfare services at the local level. 
The impacts of these services are shown in the Figure below  
Figure 5.8: Demography effects on the social welfare at the local government 
level in Norway from 1988-98. 
 
 
Source: Erling Holmoy, (2004) 
 
The pure demographic change shows relatively little effect for employment growth in 
man-hours compared with the effect of increased standards and coverage ratios. The 
effects started picking up in 1992 and have increased over the past decade. In short 
socioeconomic stability was achieved through effective and efficient institutions built 
to deliver social services across the country ,(Erling Holmoy 2004). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
The poor economic performance by the countries over periods of the resources boom 
underscores the importance of sound macroeconomic policies and strong institutions. 
The large public investment projects of the 1970s and 1980s, when governance and 
institutions were extremely weak in most of Africa, Latin America and Middle East, 
were undertaken with little scrutiny and accountability. The returns on public 
investment were unacceptably low.  Poor macro-economic management of natural 
price cycles in several African countries resulted in large exchange rate appreciation, 
eroding the competitiveness of nonoil sectors and high inflation.  
Given that most of oil economies leveraged their natural resource wealth to access 
credit from foreign suppliers and governments, the early 1990s witnessed a sharp rise 
in external debt, well above 100 percent of GDP in most cases, resulting in 
unsustainable external debt levels. These macro-economic imbalances (Collier & 
Goderis, 2007) have eventually called for very painful policy adjustments, such as 
sharp fiscal contraction, trade liberalization, exchange rate adjustment and debt 
scheduling.  
In addition, with weak institutions including legal systems, there is a higher return on 
rent seeking behavior and a higher occurrence of crime, corruption, unfair company 
takeovers and other shady dealings. A resource bonanza thus elicits more rent seekers 
and reduces the number of productive entrepreneurs. In the long run, profits fall, 
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resulting in an economy that is worse off. Thus, if institutions are weak and 
conditions are not favourable, dependency on oil and on other natural resources 
hinders democracy and the quality of governance‟ (Ross, 1999; Ploeg 2007). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
COMPARISON OF OUTCOMES 
 
This chapter discusses the macro and micro indicators of the countries with particular 
reference to stability, low and growth volatility; social policy with reference to per 
capita expenditure on education, literacy rate, unemployment, infant mortality and 
life expectancy. This brings together the countries‟ performance during the period 
and concluding remarks.  
 
6.1 Macroeconomic Policy Outcomes 
 
As inferred from Chapter Four, oil production, to a large extent, plays a 
complementary role for GDP growth in the oil economies. This is because it is 
positively correlated with GDP per capita, though less significant relationship. This is 
more of a reason as to why, most of the oil economies in Scandinavia, Latin America, 
Asia, Middle East and Africa took steps to reform their economic structures to 
improve the socioeconomic lives of their people. The most important factors that 
determined the impact of oil production in Norway and Nigeria, for instance, go 
beyond oil production. Macroeconomic policies of the respective countries played a 
role in their successes and failures. The changes in macroeconomic policies over the 
last forty years (depending on the country) have been as important as the changes in 
development models. The 1970s and the early 1980s marked the loose 
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macroeconomic policy, as fiscal and current account deficits reached alarming 
proportion of most of the countries.  
 
6.1.1 Stabilization 
 
Since the beginning of 1980 there has been sterling effort by countries to create 
economic stability. One of such initiative was to reduce inflation to be below 1 
percent, and make goods and services cheaper for the population. Monetary policy 
was formulated by these countries to stabilize the economy. Interest rates were a key 
instrument of stabilization tool in combination with both floating exchange rates and 
fixed or semi-fixed schemes. In some countries, between 1980s and 1990s, the 
exchange rate was primarily used to lower inflation.  In other case, it was set in order 
to maintain international competitiveness and stimulate growth. All these boiled 
down in creating economic stability and set the tone for social development. The 
table below shows the trend of inflation that prevailed over the period beginning from 
1980 to 2008 
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Table 6.1: Inflation trends for countries from 1980 to 2008 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Algeria 14.1 12.5 47.4     21.8     0.1   1.7  4.9 
Angola 46.7   1.8    1.8 2672.2 325.0 22.9 13.7 
Botswana 12.1   8.1  11.4     10.1     8.5   8.6   8.1 
Indonesia 18.0   4.7   7.8       9.4    3.8 10.5   4.8 
Mexico 26.5 57.8 26.7     35.0    9.5   3.9   5.3 
Nigeria   9.9   3.2   7.9     72.7    6.9 17.9 12.4 
Norway 13.5   5.7  4.4       2.2    2.9   1.8   2.1 
Qatar   6.8   1.1  3.0       2.9    1.7   8.8 15.0 
Saudi Arabia   4.4  -3.1  2.1       5.1   -1.1   0.6   5.0 
UAE 10.1   3.5 0.6       4.4    1.4   5.0 12.2 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook data (2010) 
 
After 1980, the pace of controlling inflation was stepped up by countries such as 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Norway to reduce inflation from 13.5 
percent to 1.8 percent over 25 years between 1980 to 2005. Throughout the period 
Indonesia and Botswana maintained inflation below 18 percent. Nigeria could not 
maintain the single-digit inflation from 1980- 1990, and instead inflation increases to 
72.7 percent in 1995, when fiscal discipline gets out of hand. The country could 
control inflation thereafter to 12.4 in 2008.  Angola had a terrible inflation rate of 
2672.2 percent in1995 when the economy shrunk to its lowest level in the history of 
the country.  Fiscal and monetary measures were introduced to mop up excess 
liquidity, reduce government expenditure and borrowing, and increase taxes to 
control the inflation to 13.1 percent in 2008. If we combine the information in Table 
 94 
 
6.1 and compare patterns of macroeconomic policy by using inflation in assessing the 
outcomes across the countries, Norway put up the strongest emphasis on reducing 
inflation. Not much has been seen in Nigeria and Angola with inflation well above 10 
percent in 2008. The rationale may be attributed to political instability and world 
economic recession over the period.  
 
6.1.2 Low and Volatile Growth 
 
According to conventional wisdom, the process of economic development has 
something to do with the achievement of sustained growth in GNP per capita. The 
structural change that gives rise to manufacturing industry and high-income services 
for national income and employment is principal for development. The structure 
reform processes in Norway, Indonesia and Malaysia at the beginning of oil 
production played important role in their economic successes. By and large, they 
ensured strict discipline in the management of the economy, embraced diversification 
with outward orientation policies which helped countries such as Japan, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and China to achieve 
rapid economic growth. Singapore, for example, came to record surplus in its current 
account balance over the time from negative 5.6  in 1980 to positive 25.6 as at the 
end of 2006 (Chia W. Mun & Sng H. Ying 2009:84). Table 6.2 show the GDP growth 
rate from 1975-2008 
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Table 6.2: GDP growth at constant price: 1975-2008 
 
Country 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Algeria   10.3   -5.4     5.6    1.3    3.8    2.2   5.1   2.4 
Angola     n.a    2.4     3.5  - 3.5  15.0    3.0 20.6 13.3 
Botswana     8.5  12.0     7.7     8.8    8.0    5.9   1.6   3.1 
Chile -12.9    7.9     1.9     3.7  10.6    4.5   5.5   3.7 
Indonesia     4.9    9.8     2.5     7.2    8.2    5.4   5.7   6.0 
Mexico     5.7    9.5     2.2 5.2   -6.2    6.6   3.2   1.5 
Nigeria 0.2    2.9     8.3   12.8   -0.3    5.3   5.4   5.9 
Norway     4.0    4.5     5.4     1.9    4.1    3.3   2.7   0.8 
Qatar     5.9   -1.0  -13.0 -14.6    3.6  10.9   7.6 25.4 
Saudi Arabia     0.3    6.5    -4.3     8.3    0.2    4.8   5.6  4.2 
Venezuela     6.1   -1.9     0.2     6.4    3.9    3.7 10.3  4.7 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook data (2010) 
 
It can be seen that Chile‟s -12.9 growth rates in 1975 was the result of stagnated 
agriculture growth and the promotion of import substitution industrialization which 
hindered the development of exports and severely restricted external trade options for 
the economy. The instability of traditional export prices was transmitted to the 
domestic economy through recurrent balance of payments shocks (Ffrench-Davis and 
Munoz, 1992). As a result, there was a shift to liberalization of the economy instead 
of depending on the traditional exports of copper. Private sector led-growth supported 
by an active fiscal discipline was promoted. The government took active role in the 
creation of public enterprises. The programs for structural reform that produce social 
change were promoted, including agrarian reform.  
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In the case of Venezuela, initially, the GDP growth rate was relatively high in the 
1970s, mainly due to the increase of oil revenue accrued to the country at that time. 
The country went into serious debt crisis in 1980, after which the economic structure 
was overhauled by liberalizing capital markets, foreign trade, prices, and exchange 
rates. Venezuela attracted foreign investors after the economy was opened up for 
demand and supply to determine prices by the former President Pérez in the late 
1980s, (Julia Holman, 1996). It recovered in 1990 with a growth rate of 6.5 percent 
following the overhaule of the economy, but fell sharply to 3.9 percent in 1995. The 
fall was the result of the popular resistance to deregulation and higher consumer 
prices in 1993. This undermined the reform effort and derailed the economic reform 
recovery gains. Following the upsurge of world oil prices, the economy grew by 10.3 
percent in 2005 and this provided the basis for Chávez regime to increase spending 
on health, education and poverty reduction programs. 
 
Botswana experienced rather high GDP growth, reaching above 5 percent between 
1980 and 2000, and fell rapidly below 3.5 percent after 2000. Indonesia maintained 
steady growth after 1990, with GDP growth rate above 5 percent. Other countries had 
turbulent growth rates during the period: Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Mexico, recorded 
growth rates above 3 percent over the entire period. Nigeria economy initially grew 
by 0.2 percent in 1975 and reached its peak in 1990 and fell to 5.9 percent in 2008. 
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Likewise, Angola recorded growth rates of 2.4 percent in 1980, but the economy 
grew rapidly in 2005, following the sharp increase of oil prices.  
In a nutshell, all the economies suffered low and volatile GDP growth over the period 
from 1975-2000. However, most of them grew above 5 percent between 2000-2008, 
with the highest growth rate recorded by Angola of 20.5 percent in 2005, and Qatar 
25.4 percent. In terms of inflation, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates and Indonesia were relatively disciplined with their fiscal management as 
compared to Angola, Mexico, Nigeria and Algeria in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In spite of these trends, we cannot use GDP growth alone to draw conclusion over the 
living standard of the population. Conditions may improve in spite of a stagnated or 
slow growth of GDP growth of a country. For this perspective, economic and social 
indicators give a clearer picture of development in the economies. Human 
Development Index (HDI) gives non-weighted average of three variables: per capita 
gross domestic income, life expectancy at birth and the level of education (Adam 
2010:15) 
 
6.2 Social Policy and Social Expenditure 
 
Human development is the centre of every development activity, and is driven by 
socioeconomic well- being of the people. The population‟s well being becomes more 
important and forms integral part of enforcing and shaping the welfare of society.  
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The principle underlying this idea is to get the government free public resources for 
social development and move away from the productive activities, where the private 
sector could do better work. The World Bank‟s market-oriented policy and the 
Washington consensus embedded this idea. One of the cardinal principles of the 
World Bank is investment in the people, including education, health care, nutrition 
and family planning. In the same vein, one of the ten items in the Washington 
consensus was adjusting fiscal priorities to give greater attention to health and 
education. These policies, which form part of the social policy framework, have been 
accepted, and form an essential way to ensure high productivity and better economic 
performance while increasing the quality of lives.  
 
The concept of social policy refers to all government interventions that go to improve 
the welfare of the population. Practically, its definition changes from country to 
country in terms of scope and the types of activities involved. Generally, it includes 
health and education, while others may include programs oriented towards particular 
groups, for instance, labour, elderly, or women, and the handicapped; or to unravel 
particular problems such as poverty alleviation. For this thesis, we focus on the trend 
in quantum of the percentage of social expenditure in terms of GDP per capita which 
is a central component of achieving improved quality life for the population. 
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Government‟s overall social expenditure includes a variety of activities that have 
different effects on economic performance and on the distribution of income and 
welfare. Governments in Norway, Japan and Chile divide social spending into four 
categories: education, health, social security and others (including housing subsidies). 
Education and health are often accorded essential for human capital formation useful 
for promoting economic development, and are progressively pursued in terms of 
allocating public resources. The graph below shows the pattern of social expenditure 
as share of GDP. 
Figure 6.1 Pattern of social Expenditure as a percentage share of GDP by 
Norway, Japan and Chile between 1980-2007 
 
 
Source: OECD statistics 2009, ECLAC (1999) and Mostaja (2000). 
 
The three countries gave greater priority to the expenditure on social activities in the 
1990s. Norway per capita social expenditure has increased from 1980-1990 which 
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correlated with the GDP growth over the period. Per capita social expenditure 
decreased in the late 1990s to 2007, when GDP growth contracted over the period, 
even though, it occupies more than 20 percent of total GDP. In contrast, Japan 
consistently increased its per capita social expenditure over a decade and maintained 
steady increase after 2005.   Chile‟s social expenditure as a share of total public 
expenditure began increasing in 1985 and followed up to 2000. It then declined 
afterwards. The share in 1990-2000 was generally higher than in 1980-90, but the 
intra period pattern was more mixed.  
 
6.2.1 Per Capita Expenditure on Education as a percentage share of GDP 
 
Per capita expenditure on education has direct relationship with GDP per capita 
growth in the oil economies. Considering the countries on individual bases, the GDP 
share of government expenditure on education in Norway grew at lower rate from 6.3 
percent in 1980s to 7.0 percent in 1990, and fell to 6.6 percent in 2000. After 2000, 
government expenditure increased to 7.0 percent; total expenditure as percentage of 
GDP fell slightly in 2006 and 2007 as shown in the Table 6.3 below 
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Table 6.3: Government expenditure on Education (%GDP) 
 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria n.a n.a 3.2 2.9 3.6 3.5 
Angola n.a 3.9 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 
Botswana 5.5 5.8 6.5 9.7 7.9 8.1 
Chile 4.5 2.4 3.9 3.4 3.2 3.4 
Indonesia n.a n.a n.a 2.9 3.6 3.5 
Malaysia  5.7 5.1 6.0 7.5 4,7 4.5 
Mexico 4.6 3.6 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.8 
Nigeria 3.6 0.9 n.a 2.9 3.6 3.5 
Norway  6.3 7.0 6.6 7.0 6.5 6.7 
Saudi Arabia 4.3 6.6 5.9 5.7 6.2 6.4 
UAE 1.3 1.8 2.0 1.3 1.1 0.9 
Venezuela 4.6 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.7 
 
Source: International Human Development Indicators (2010)  
 
Similarly, Malaysia, Botswana, and Saudi Arabia spend over 5 percent of GDP on 
education. Within the period the expenditure depicts a fluctuation pattern, or a 
quadratic behavior for these countries. On the other hand, Nigeria, Algeria and 
Angola spent less than 4 percent on education. These trends among education 
spending in all the countries are marked by what Ethan and Carlos (2008) called „pro-
cyclical‟. Thus when economic activity contracted, social spending fell by even more, 
with a decline in the share of social spending in GDP, and when economic activity 
expanded, social spending increased. 
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6.3 Literacy rates 
 
One essential outcomes of investment in educational process is the increased literacy 
rate. A literate society enables knowledge and skills transfer to families. The tasks for 
transferring knowledge and skills have shifted from families to formal educational 
institutions which are undergoing processes of social differentiation (Hardiman and 
Modgley {1982}). Literacy becomes more and more important for promoting social 
participation, personal awareness and cultural education. Literate society increases 
productivity.  
 
Basically, education offers a person not only the right to read, write and do 
mathematics or sciences, but also includes vocational skills, domestic skills, 
knowledge of hygiene, knowledge of the science, artistic skills, an understanding of 
one‟s social environment, development of personal skills and moral traits. It is 
expected that a person acquiring these skills would be able to contribute to the 
socioeconomic development of the society. This thesis considers adult literacy rates 
for both sexes of 15 years and older as literacy level, and important outcomes of 
investment in education.  
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Table 6.4: Adult literacy rate for both sexes 15 and above years old in the 
eleven countries from 1980- 2008(percent) 
 
 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Algeria    n.a 49.6 69.9 73.7 74.6 75.4 76.2 
Angola    n.a n.a 67.4 67.4 67.4 67.4 67.4 
Botswana 39.9 68.6 68.6 81.5 82.2 82.9 83.6 
Chile 91.1 94.3 95.7 96.4 96.5 96.6 96.8 
Indonesia 67.3 81.5 81.5 92.0 92.0 92.0 92.0 
Mexico 83.0 87.6 90.5 91.6 91.7 92.8 92.8 
Malaysia 69.5 82.9 88.7 91.2 91.5 91.9 92.2 
Nigeria   n.a 55.4 64.7 70.0 71.0 72.0 72.0 
Saudi Arabia   n.a 70.8 79.4 83.6 84.3 85.0 85.6 
UAE 53.5 71.2 71.2 90.0 90.1 90.1 90.1 
Venezuela 84.7 89.8 93.0 95.2 95.2 95.2 95.2 
 
Source: International Human Development Indicator (2010) 
 
The general trends in the countries at the beginning of 1980 were quite good for 
Chile, Venezuela and Mexico. However, Countries such as Nigeria, Algeria and 
Angola performed below expectation, with the resources at their disposal (see table 
6.4).  
Almost all the countries have achieved literacy rates close to 65 percent by 2000. 
Although young people spent more time in the education system, by 2008, high 
proportion of the population has attained literacy rate above 72 percent, except 
Angola. Beyond this issue is the question of the quality of labour force,  African, 
Middle Eastern and Latin American countries from 1980 to 2008 have had serious 
problems with the quality of labour force from educational institutions. The problems 
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were of poor training of teachers‟,  student-teacher ratios, poor quality of textbooks, 
lack of other teaching and learning equipments, and an emphasis on rote learning 
rather than problem solving (Adam Szirmai 2010). The situation is particularly 
serious in Nigeria for 1980s and 90s when large proportion of the work force has only 
six years of schooling (Onah 1994). In contrast, countries like Norway, Japan and 
Singapore have efficient and effective educational systems, acceptable teacher-
student ratio, modern school teaching and learning materials and teaching tailored to 
problem solving, which turn out highly skilled labour 
 
6.4 Unemployment 
 
The other important aspect in the labour force had to do with levels of education and 
experience. The World Bank (2000, Table 3) has indicated that in low-income 
countries, the labour force grew above 2.4 percent per year, exceeding the average 
rate of population growth of 2 percent per annum. In the middle income countries the 
labour force grew by 1.5 percent per annum. On annual basis, more youth are turned 
out into the labour market in developing economies than in middle income 
economies. The influx of large numbers of unskilled youth into the labour market 
caused lower wages and increases unemployment and underemployment, thereby 
giving rise to poverty. The capacities of the economies are unable to absorb them and 
hence create socioeconomic problems. Underemployment of labour is a situation 
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when people work shorter hours  than they would prefer to work or when labour 
productivity is so low that people can hardly earn enough to survive, in spite of 
working very long hours, (Adam, 2010:157).  Table 6.5 below provides the trend of 
unemployment in the selected countries across oil producing economies. 
Table 6.5: Unemployment among selected countries from 1980-2008 
 
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Algeria 15.79 16.90 19.8 28.11 29.8 15.3 11.3 
Angola n.a n.a n.a n.a 8.15 11.52 n.a 
Chile 10.4 14.9 5.7 7.4 8.3 6.9 7.8 
Indonesia n.a 2.14 2.4 8.95 6.08 11.2 8.4 
Malaysia n.a 6.0 5.1 3.1 3.0 3.5 3.3 
Mexico n.a n.a n.a 6.9 5.4 3.5 3.5 
Nigeria n.a n.a 3.20 2.1 4.7 4.5 4.5 
Norway 1.6 5.3 3.4 4.6 3.3 2.5 2.6 
Saudi 
Arabia 
n.a n.a n.a n.a 4.6 5.2 5.0 
 
Source:  Compiled from World Bank data base & Economic statistical  
World Economic Outlook IMF (2010) 
 
Most of the economics are dominated by the informal sector, which contains a wide 
variety of economic activities, some of which are dynamic and profitable (Gaillard & 
Beernink 2001). Many people are forced to make a living by engaging in low-
productive activities in the peasant agriculture for both urban and rural sector in the 
economy. In other words, if the economy is unable to respond to the large supply of 
labour force, it increases income inequality. In the first place, the abundant labour 
supply weakens the position of workers in relation with owners of capital. Second, 
income inequality between various categories of workers is also increased. Incomes 
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of unskilled labourers in low productivity sectors would lag behind income in the 
informal sector of the economy. 
 
Algeria started off with 15.8 percent in 1980, increased to 29.8 percent by 2000, and 
unemployment rate decreased to 11.3 percent by 2008. Indonesia economy showed 
quite resolute progress in 1980s and early 90s with unemployment below 2.5 percent. 
After 1995 unemployment rate rose above 6 percent through to 2008, as shown in the 
Table 6.5 above. The unemployment in Chile was 10.4 percent in 1980. It was 
reduced to 6.9 percent in 2005, and rose to 7.8 percent in 2008. 
Surprisingly, unemployment rate in Nigeria was kept below 5 percent riding shoulder 
high with developed economies, like Norway or Japan or Singapore.  In Angola, 
(though unemployment rate cannot be traced between 1980-2000), the figures after 
2000s, shows that unemployment is increasing, with 8.2 percent recorded in 2005 and 
jumped to 11.5 percent in 2008. 
It can be argued that an impact of rapid increase in labour force may operate directly 
through the labour market. If labour force grows more rapidly than gainful 
employment, the share of open and disguised unemployment in the labour force 
increases. Average income per worker decreases, while unemployment and under 
employment increases among the poor. The influx of labour force will lead to 
increased income inequality, enhance the numbers in poverty and eventually lower 
their income. 
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6.5 Infant and Child Mortality 
 
Child mortality and life expectancy are two separate entities that ensure growth and 
development. Infant and child mortality refers to the chance of a child dying between 
the age of 0 to 1 year and 0 to 5years per 1000 births, WHO (1993). UN Report 
(2001) and WHO (1993) have it that by average a child born at the end of the 
twentieth century will live 21 years longer than a child born two generations earlier. 
This is primarily due to reduction in infant and child mortality. By and large, high 
infants and child mortality may show the general state of health condition in a 
country.  Table 6.5 presents data on infant and child mortality of the selected oil 
countries 
Table 6.6: Infant and child mortality rates in 1990 and 2008. 
 
Countries 1990 2000 2005 2007 2008 
Algeria   64   48   44   37   41 
Angola 260 239 227 158 220 
Botswana   50   81   36   40   31 
Chile   22   11     9     9     9 
Indonesia   86   56   46   31   41 
Malaysia   18   10     8   11     6 
Mexico   45   26    20   35   17 
Nigeria 230 207  194 189 186 
Norway     9     5      4    4     4 
S Arabia   43   23   22  25   21 
UAE   17   11     9    8     8 
 
 
Source: Compiled from World Bank database & 2000 Revision,  
population data base, and HDI (2008) 
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It can be noted from the table that individual countries have reduced infant and child 
mortality rates, with a few attaining single-digits. Norway, as usual, has reduced 
infant and child mortality from 9/1000 to 4/1000. While countries in the middle 
income, except Africa and probably Indonesia, were able to reduce infant and child 
rate from 86/1000 to 9/1000 birth. Nigeria and Angola have reduced it from 260/1000 
to 186/1000 over the period. Apart from Norway which shows exceptional case for 
oil-rich economy in matching up with the resource less like Japan or Singapore, the 
rest are nowhere near to them in terms of reducing infant and child mortality rate.  
 
So far, Nigeria and Angola have the highest infant and child mortality rates among 
the resource abundant countries. The factors attributed to these marked difference, 
comparing to Asia and Latin America, may include lack of improved medical 
technology- lack of improved curative medicine and the development of effective 
medicines, which make it impossible to treat disease which were regarded 
untreatable, for example, „the antibiotics that are used to combat various infectious 
diseases. Secondly, poor access to improve water supply, hygiene and sanitation 
facilities. Thirdly, poor combating in animal carriers of diseases (vectors), other 
factors include poor nutrition, high illiteracy rate and ignorance amongst mothers and 
lack of health-care policy‟ in maintaining child, (Adam 2010:179).  
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Middle East and Latin American economies have recorded relatively low infant 
mortality rates as indicated in the Table 6.1. The reason is, they have greater access to 
improving medical technology, water hygiene and sanitation facilities, to controlling 
victors that transmit disease such as flies, mosquitoes, worms, slugs, snails or bats to 
expanding access of women to education and to ensuring balance diet  for the 
children under 5 years.   
 
Advanced economy Norway has access to advance health facilities as a result of 
investing into advance medical technologies, research and development and so forth 
to improve the infant and child mortality. 
 
6.6 Impact on Life Expectancy 
 
 
With the health condition in these countries, life expectancy is compromised. Jean-
Pierre Poullier et.al (2002) studied on the pattern of global health expenditure and 
found that countries that spend little on health have poorer health conditions. Of the 
91 countries surveyed, countries that spend $200 per capita on health are only 47.1 
years health adjusted life expectancy. Those who have spent between $200 and $850 
per person on health, half of them have health adjusted life expectancies between 57 
and 62 years. And countries spending over $850 enjoy health adjusted life 
expectancies between 67 and 71 years. Though the GDP per capital expenditure on 
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health cannot be obtained by this research on the economies to find the linkage 
between health expenditure and life expectancy, Jean- Pierre et al‟s (2002) research is 
used as basis for health expenditure to determine the outcomes of life expectancy in 
this regard.   
 
Table 6.7: Life expectancy, 1980-2008 for Africa, Latin America, 
and Asia 
 
Country 1980 1990 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Algeria 59.6 67.0 70.1 71.7 72.0 72.2 72.4 
Angola 40.5 42.0 43.6 45.5 46.0 46.5 47.1 
Botswana 60.5 64.2 50.6 50.9 52.2 53.4 54.4 
Chile 69.1 73.6 76.8 78.2 78.3 78.5 78.6 
Indonesia 54.4 61.6 67.4 69.7 70.1 70.5 70.8 
Malaysia 67.0 70.0 73.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 74.0 
Mexico 66.6 70.8 74.3 75.5 75.7 76.0 76.2 
Nigeria 44.8 44.6 45.9 47.3 47.5 47.7 47.9 
Norway 75.7 76.8 78.8 80.0 80.3 80.5 80.7 
Saudi Arabia 61.0 67.8 71.1 72.2 72.4 72.7 72.9 
UAE 67.5 72.5 76.4 77.1 77.2 77.3 77.4 
 
 
Source: UN Human development indicators (Feb, 2010) &World Bank database 
 
The implication is that Chile, Mexico, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia 
and Indonesia have all increased per capital expenditure above $850, after 1990. On 
the other hand, Botswana, Nigeria and Angola have spent less than $200 per person 
to improve the health status of the population. The divergence between Sub-Saharan 
Africa oil rich countries and Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela continues to 
increase. The World Health Organization (WHO 2002: table 6) estimates, comparing 
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life expectancy with health status of the population without AIDS for the year 2000, 
for example, concluded that on average life expectancy at birth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
is six years lower than it would have been in the absence of AIDS for males and 
seven years lower for female. This shows the challenges confronting the health sector 
in Sub-Saharan oil economies: lack of access to health facilities, poor quality of 
service, long waiting time for treatment, poor training for doctors, low doctor ratio 
per patients, lack of medicines for new treatments and lack of physical infrastructure 
are some of the compelling needs of the people.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
On the whole, economic growth has direct relationship with social spending. Lack of 
growth occurs when the rate of growth of national income does not exceed population 
growth, all things being equal. Growth of per capita income will result in the 
reduction of poverty. Negative growth increases poverty as can be inferred from table 
5.2 over some of the oil economies that went through serious problem as a result of 
negative growth that contracted their economies. Social spending, relative to 
education and health, are therefore hampered whenever the economy shrinks.  Ethan 
and Carlos (2008) referred it as „pro-cyclical‟, thus when economic activity contracts, 
social spending fall by even more, with a decline in the share of social spending in 
GDP per capita growth, and when economic activity expands, social spending 
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increases. This linear relationship between economic growth and social spending was 
common feature among oil economies in Africa, Middle East and Latin America.  
Even though this condition exists, Norway has managed its natural resource revenue 
satisfactorily, and invested into health facilities and health services to improve health 
adjusted life expectancy of its population, the Middle East, Latin America and Asia 
have to a large extent improved the health adjusted life expectancy of their 
population. Sub-Saharan African has not invested enough to improve the health status 
of the population. 
The problem of poor training of teachers‟, student-teacher ratios, poor quality of 
textbooks, lack of other teaching and learning equipment, and an emphasis on rote 
learning rather than problem solving are faced by African, Latin America and Middle 
East Countries need immediate attention. 
The question to avert this trend of economies falling into procyclical condition, The 
probable window is to create favourable environment for private sector investment, 
and put emphasis on mobilization of saving and to act as investor where private 
sector cannot invest due to the huge capital outlay in such ventures. Many countries 
in East Asia have invested heavily in developing human resource base during the 
initial stages of economic development and industrial take-off.  
 
 113 
 
The challenges in the health sector, especially, Sub-Saharan Africa oil economies 
need prompt attention in such areas as lack of access to health facilities, inadequate 
health personnels, poor quality of service, long waiting time for treatment, poor 
training for doctors, low doctor ratio per patient, lack of medicines for new treatments 
and lack of physical infrastructure, which are compelling needs of the people. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
 
As per the objectives of the research, this chapter proceeds to discuss the findings or 
lessons and its implication for Ghana‟s socioeconomic development and poverty 
reduction. Finally the thesis makes some recommendations that will go a long way to 
inform policy makers, as to the sort of policies that need immediate attention and 
long lasting solution of concerns of the chiefs and people of Cape Three Points. 
 
7.1 Human development and Quality of life  
 
The quality of life for the oil economies varies from one geographical region to 
another. Those in Africa are worse off compared to the Middle East and Latin 
American economies, which have had marked improvement in the quality of life for 
their people over the past three decades. Samuel Preston (1975) who studied the 
relationship between average per capita income and life expectancy at a given 
moment in time established that the level of income and the average life expectancy 
are closely related. The analysis in chapter 6 also proved that life expectancy has 
positively correlation with GDP per capita, though less significant relationship. This 
precludes that life expectancy may matter in the determination of improved 
socioeconomic development of oil economies. Norway has been able to match up 
high GDP per capita income with high per capital social expenditure and attained 
high life expectancy for its population.  
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Oil economies that spent less on social activities as compared to Norway managed to 
attain medium human development status. The transformation of Chile, United Arab 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Mexico came as a result of huge investments into health, 
education and the general well-being of the people. it must be pointed out that 
(Barlow, 1979; Fogel 1994; 1997; Keyzer, 1993; Mayer, 2001; Mushkin, 1962; 
Popkin, 1978; Strauss and Thomas, 1998; Walsh,1990; who,1999) re-echoed this 
position that „health and education are important aspects of human capital, and that 
investments and improvements in them have major positive impacts on economic 
growth and development‟. Therefore, one cannot easily segregate micro-level and 
macro-level relationships between health, education and economic performances. 
There is the need to recognize the causal channels through which health and 
education affects the economic lives and performance of individuals and household, 
as well as economic development. Investment in health and education promote 
economic development. 
 
The human development indices for Ghana can be described as „staggering‟. Ministry 
of Health statistics (2008) shows that the infant mortality rate, decreased from 133 
per 1000 live births in 1957 to 56.6 by 1998 and rose to 77 per 1000 live birth. Again, 
over the same period of 1957-1998, mortality rate for children less than 5 years old 
dropped from 147.8 per 1000 live births to 107.6, and increased to 111 by the end of 
2006. Life expectancy rates also showed a decrease from 58 in 1992 to 57.1 in 2010. 
All these can be attributed to low per capita expenditure to the health sector of the 
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economy. It is not surprising that the former Minister of Health Mr. Courage 
Quashiga has stated that the greatest challenge of the health sector is the human 
resource deficit, healthcare financing and lack of multi-sectoral collaboration among 
the players in the health delivery sector.  
Second is the high rate of illiteracy and ignorance. Over the past three decades the 
illiteracy saw relatively small change from 28.4 to 25.2 by the end of 2008. 
Furthermore, the increasing gap between fundamental or basic education and formal 
education is a matter of concern. As compared to the previous system of education 
inherited from the British when one could easily tell the linkage between fundamental 
or basic education and formal schooling in the country, current education system has 
failed to achieve the linkage.  Nonetheless, more emphasis is being placed now on 
formal schooling system than basic education. Slowly, the fundamental or basic 
education is being relegated to the background with an assumption that formal 
schooling has subsumed the fundamental or basic education. 
 
 
7.2 Fiscal discipline 
 
 
Fiscal policy changes may have effects on macroeconomic outcomes of oil 
economies in the face of frequent commodity price changes. Bad policy often brings 
about volatility to the economy. Most of the oil economies have had to deal with the 
issue of pro-cyclical fiscal discipline. According to Gavin and Perotti (1997), many 
Latin American countries‟ fiscal discipline displayed pro-cyclical behaviors. The 
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reason was that in good periods, spending increases in excess over increases in 
revenue. The effect was, fiscal position was always not compatible with the cyclical 
position of the economy. The exogenous change in fiscal discipline or cyclical 
change runs opposite to what would have been appropriate, given the circumstances. 
This leads to the reduction in effective management of the economy. 
 
 
In some instances discretionary spending, as in the case of most African and Latin 
American oil economies, identifies changes in fiscal variables that are unrelated to 
economic conditions. These changes, which are usually in taxes or spending during 
election times either for reelection purposes or because of ideological changes in the 
government throw away the fiscal discipline. This opportunistic spending causes 
unnecessary economic volatility which in the long run lowers growth. Norway, 
Botswana, Indonesia, Malaysia and Chile were fiscally disciplined in managing their 
economies, have chock successes in economic growth and to a large extent are 
leaving up to the expectation of their population.  
 
 
Ghana is prone to both pro-cyclical and volatile fiscal problems that affect oil 
economies. The revenue from gold, cocoa, diamond and bauxite over the years has 
faced these forms of fiscal discipline and find them hard to manage. The question is 
how prepared is the country in the management of volatility that is associated with oil 
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production if it finds it difficult in providing fiscal discipline for traditional 
commodities. 
 
7.3 Resource curse and Dutch disease 
 
Even though most of the oil economies undertook massive expenditure during 
economic boom, African, Latin America, and the Middle East economies had to face 
challenges with the Dutch disease, the appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is 
as a result of increasing demand of non-tradable goods and services such as public 
services, land, housing, construction, local specialties, machine rentals, 
transportation, processing, and handling, given the limited supply responses and 
eventually lost export competitiveness. The second reason is the decrease in 
productivity when more factors get chocked up in non-tradable sectors where 
potential productivity gains are much limited. The third, of course, is the existence of 
re-allocation (investments, migrations) and transition costs (lost markets and know-
how), which made temporary specialization very costly to the society, (Rose, 2006). 
 
Certainly, the harmony between significant oil wealth and large-scale poverty is a 
“paradox of plenty” if not outright resource curse in itself (AfDB, 2009). The 
economies must fashion out a system that will create long lasting wealth rather than 
short run, as the case of oil boom may bring to the nation, and be converted to capital 
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in the form of human, financial and infrastructure and more sustainable livelihood 
opportunities (AfDB, 2009).  
For oil economies, higher oil prices are expected to be a blessing rather than a curse. 
Given credence to the revenue accrued to the countries in the early 1970s as provided 
by Table 5.1. Most of the countries used the revenue to implement economic policies 
to promote economic growth and social development. Algeria economy grew by 10.3 
percent in 1975 and invested into import substitution industrialization, while 
Venezuela grown by 6.1 percent, and invested into human resource capacity and 
institutional development. Saudi Arabia undertook massive and vigorous 
infrastructure development, Indonesia initiated balanced growth concept for both 
rural and urban areas. Most of these countries were faced with the issue of the Dutch 
disease. 
 
Ghana has a large and growing non tradable (non-agricultural) sector, comprising 
many parts of the public sector and a wide range of private sector. The activities are 
dominated by construction, finance, and servicing large resource-based extractive 
industries such as gold, diamond, bauxite, manganese, and remittances and foreign 
aid. Structural transformation has been slow in the face of low productivity, and 
hence low export competitiveness. Factor prices like land and labor remain high in 
comparison with marginal productivity, output increase by marginal. World Bank 
report on Ghana oil production (2009:11) observed that for the last two decades non-
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traditional exports have only grown modestly and not enough to change the position 
of traditional exports of gold, cocoa and timber whose respective positions have only 
varied in time with international prices. 
 
The Dutch disease, therefore, serves as a threat to agriculture potential for growth and 
poverty reduction. With oil revenue coming into the main stream of government 
revenue, Ghana„s economy may tend to discourage commercial agriculture, despite 
having large track of fertile land for agriculture. Subsistence farming would not be 
affected, as producers produce to feed the family, however, the reduction in 
commercial agriculture would weaken rural households „ability to graduate from 
poverty. In reference to poverty strategic reduction (2006), in 2005/6, more than 85 
percent of Ghana„s poor were living in rural areas. There is the threat that with the 
onset of oil production rural-urban migration mostly of the youth will increase, while 
labour in agriculture will fall.  
 
7.4 Weak Institutions 
 
The discussion in chapter five indicated that government effectiveness and 
accountability are positively in correlated, with GDP per capita. Government 
effectiveness shown by Norway, Malaysia, Indonesia (to a large extent), and Saudi 
Arabia means government effectiveness and accountability have significant 
relationship with GDP growth among these economies. The failure of most economic 
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and social policies has been attributed to constraint of institutional capabilities by the 
policy implementers themselves, as in the case of Algeria, Venezuela and Nigeria. 
This issue of institutional capabilities, as observed by Gelb and Turner, (2007), see 
the problem as a principal agent problem. The revenue and management of the oil 
resource are done by government on behalf of its people. But, more often than not, 
lack of clear ownership, roles and responsibility between African political leadership 
on one hand and their institutions on the other ends up with squandering the resources 
accrued to the economy. Institutions to either restrain politicians or render 
accountability to the population either weak or lack the capacity to perform. In 
addition to the oil companies who conspired with political authority, indulge in rent 
seeking behavior and corruption. This often rope in increased political patronage and 
subsequently lower entrepreneurship spirit, lower capacity for investment, increased 
authoritarianism, and to some extent create civil conflict among tribes and groups 
especially communities where the oil is extracted.  
 
Ross (1999) provides a good summary of three types of reasons for policy failure:(i) 
„cognitive reasons – resource rents are seen to induce a get rich quickly mentality, 
resulting in short-sighted policy decisions and excessive spending; (ii) societal 
reasons – countries often have existing interest groups with significant political 
leverage on the state who block growth enhancing policies; and (iii) statist reasons – 
states are free from the need to levy domestic taxes and therefore become less 
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accountable to citizens since they no longer need either their votes or their taxes and 
devote rents to guarding the status quo‟.  Institutional quality construct separated 
from political forces will put the institutions in an effective and efficient position to 
perform their activities.  
 
Most political economists such as Bourguignon & Dessus,( 2009); Moss & Young 
(2009) who studied the institutions in Ghana concluded that Ghana was more 
„grabber friendly‟ than „producer friendly‟. The World Bank (2007) recent 
institutional assessment reaffirmed that with the advent of a multi party system in 
1992, Ghana had moved from a positive to a negative outlier in the measure of 
bureaucratic quality. This means that with the advent of change in government, there 
was no longer the need to serve the public interest. This wakeup call needs immediate 
attention if the oil fund is to serve as a blessing rather than a curse. 
 
7.5 Land Reform 
 
Land as a factor of production and an input into the production process has positive 
correlation with GDP per capita income. This implies that land has a role to play in 
GDP per capita income of the economy. This is why most of the countries went 
through land reforms to position agriculture to play its role effectively and efficiently 
in the economic development; Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria and (even resource less 
countries like Japan and Singapore) undertook land reform. Although there were 
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variations in individual country‟s land reforms, Japan‟s land Reform has been seen by 
many researchers as fairly distributed, and work towards equitable society. However, 
in countries such as Venezuela, Algeria, Iran, Chile and Nigeria, land reforms have 
put greater proportion of land in the hands of oil companies, businessmen, 
bureaucrats, and political leaders (as shown in chapter 5). Thus the reforms provided 
safe havens for those powerful and influential in the society to manipulate the use of 
land as well as production activities. Majority of the population were left without land 
to depend on for the rest of their lives. The result was that the indigenes formed 
groups, some of which were transformed into pressure groups to fight for their rights 
to access- land and other mineral resources. For instance, indigenous groups in 
Ogoni, Ijaw of Nigeria; Kirineri, Nahua, Nanti- Peru; Uwa- Colombia; Karen-Burma 
and Paumari Apurina, Deni of Brazil are some of the groups formed around oil 
production. 
The current Ghana land reform program being undertaken must work towards social 
equity. Ghana can take a cue from Japan‟s land reform where land was relatively 
distributed somewhat devoid of acrimonies and tension among the local people. It is 
important to note that Ghana is increasingly showing social disparities and social 
divisions amongst ethnic and tribal lines, which pose a threat in the face of oil boom. 
Afro barometer survey (2005), confirmed that the regional inequalities are increasing 
and the role of ethnic identity seems to be increasing with ethnic grievances rising.  
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7.6 Mismanagement and corruption 
 
 Accountability and control of corruption are positively correlated to GDP growth and 
significant for economies development. Although accountability and control of 
corruptions promote GDP growth, not much attention has been given to them by 
some oil economies in Africa, Middle East and Latin America, as indicates in chapter 
5. This premise therefore sides with majority of the researchers in this field of study 
who provided evidence that „natural resource booms often decrease the quality of 
public spending and encourage rent seeking‟ (Ploeg, 2007; Auty, 2001; Auty, 2004; 
Stevens, 2003). This is because the fiscal resources from resource booms is 
concentrated in the hands of bureaucrats (most of whom align themselves to 
politically dominant groups in power) and there is a tendency to promote unwarranted 
and reckless investment. For example, president Boumedienne of Algeria invested 
recklessly in the construction of shopping malls, which were eventually owned by 
bureaucrats and crones around him (Lowe, 2009:89).  
 
The issue is that natural resource revenues have the tendency to replace more stable 
and sustainable revenue streams, which worsen the problems of transparency and 
accountability. Government tends to over rely on the “sizeable” resource revenues, 
with little emphasis on the non-resource taxes and other government incomes. This 
provided easy way for governments to dodge the issue of fiscal transparency and 
accountability that arise when people pay taxes. The danger is that „rent seeking 
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behavior poses significant amount of revenue loss to the economy. Second, it also 
diverts attention from long-term development goals to maximizing rent creation. 
Third, it seeks to create extremely powerful lobby groups that are able to block 
needed economic reforms. Fourth, societies face severe impediments to innovation as 
a result of the behavior of special interest groups. Fifth, rent seeking makes it more 
difficult for governments to adjust spending when faced with revenue fluctuations. 
Finally, rent seeking is equivalent to the creation of monopoly power in an economy 
and the social costs of such monopolization are higher if the costs to maintain that 
monopoly are added‟ (Stevens, 2003). 
 
To date, Ghana has no law that regulates the use of oil revenue (though one is being 
debated in parliament), or policy guideline for the revenue usage. All the issues 
around the revenue are political rhetoric by political heads as to how the revenue 
would be used. The danger is that the country is threading the path of 
mismanagement and corruption by politicians and bureaucrats as there is no cogent 
policy guidelines for monitoring and tracking out oil revenue.  
 
The tax system in Ghana like any other developing countries is confronted with 
numerous problems. It ranges from tax invasion (porous nature of the tax regimes), 
corruption, attitude of Ghanaians to pay tax, poor capacity of tax institutions to carry 
out their mandates, poor tax laws enforcement and large informal sector. This 
 126 
 
teeming problems steering in the face of the tax system has the greater chance to be 
enhanced when the oil revenue comes to the main revenue stream. As one official for 
internal revenue office in Accra stated during preliminary interview, „government 
will pay no attention to tax system and allow the institutions to go to sleep at the end 
of the day”.  
 
 
7.7 Political and cultural acculturation   
 
Political instability is negatively correlated but highly significant relationship with 
GDP per capita income. This implies that political stability plays significant role in 
GDP per capital growth. Therefore, countries with rich natural resources were more 
likely to experience failed or slow transitions to democracy. Although the empirical 
study shows that ‘a one percentage point increase in resource dependence leads to 
democracy index dropping of 2.15 percent and that resource-abundance were more 
likely to be authoritarian and experience breakdowns in democracy after the 
democratic transition‟ (Jensen & Wantcheken 2004) 
 
Fundamentally, political instability is often caused by lack of national cohesion, 
especially where loyalty is particularly oriented to a specific area, group or groups, 
tribe, ethnic group or family. A classical example is the class, political and racial 
polarization that has surfaced in Venezuela after the election of President Hugo 
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Chavez (Miguel Sala 2009:1); Nigeria, Algeria, Iraq and Iran are all rocked by ethnic 
divisions, which threatens national unity. Second, oil companies often break the 
culture of the people with impunity, break the stronghold of the old landed elite, 
stimulates the growth of middle class, reorganize section of the society to suit their 
whims and caprices, determine local and national policy direction and end up 
influencing the perspective of the community or the country. Thus they create their 
own „kingdoms‟ with set of rules and regulation against the rules and regulations of 
the country or communities in which they operate.  
A case in point is the oil communities in Cabimas-Venezuela, Niger delta-Nigeria 
and Angola. Besides, there is insufficient guarantee for human rights, as the military 
is assigned the role of protecting the operations of the oil companies (thus rule of law 
is poorly observed).  
 
There is no doubt, Ghana‟s young democracy has been praised by many as a beacon 
for Africa, well ahead of South Africa, Botswana and Namibia. All the necessary 
institutions to represent a democratic state are in place.  The legislature, executive 
and the judiciary are to a large extent autonomous both in body and function, the 
media operate freely, and there is also Human Right and Administration Justice. But 
there is the question of capacity and insight into their core function to make these 
institutions effective and efficient in a democratic environment. Critical assessment 
reveals that Ghana indeed has a long way to go. It is important to also recognize that 
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Ghana as a „nation-state‟ is being weakened by political force, loyalty, and feelings of 
solidarity with a common national culture and society is gradually given way to 
group that one belongs, tribe, ethnic group or family or clan one hauls from. This is 
dangerous to start with as a nation in the face of oil production and its problems. 
 
7.8. Recommendations and the way forward 
 
 
7.8.1 Institutional Development and Capacity Building 
  
The institutional set-up and its relation to socioeconomic development are extremely 
important in the case of Ghana for further enhancing the relationship among 
production, accumulation of capital and equitable distribution. Institutions provide 
the incentive structure for which formal rules, constitutions, laws and regulations, and 
informal constraints, conventions, norms of behavior and self-imposed codes of 
conduct, and their enforcement characteristics (North 1993).  
Ghana faces significant institutional capacity challenges, in terms of socioeconomic 
capabilities that enhance growth and distribute effective social services. These 
challenges can be addressed not only within government, but among 
parliamentarians, judiciary, civil society groups, journalists, and other relevant 
agencies having direct link to the oil production. They need to be strengthened in 
order to play useful role in the collective management and oversee the petroleum 
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sector for the common good. The capacity building should be across board, from 
GNPC and the yet-to-be-created GPRA; to the Ministry of Energy, Ministry of 
Finance and Economic Planning, and EPA, and to other government ministries, 
departments, and agencies. Ghana will need expertise to monitor production costs on 
the deepwater field, staff in the Internal Revenue Service who can understand the 
complex calculations in the petroleum agreements that determine the government 
stake, auditors who can audit oil company books, investment specialists who can 
understand and help manage potential oil savings or stabilization funds, and so on. 
Investment in the institutional capacities will help Ghana to avoid early mistakes 
experienced by Nigeria, Angola and others to increase the revenue that can be used to 
support poverty reduction programs. 
 
7.8.2 Management of the resource  
 
 
It is proven fact that real consensus building at the design stage around what the oil 
rents will be used for and how they will be managed, is the surest way to ensure its 
proper management. This has been tested by São Tomé which designed inclusive 
procedures of creating some sort of consensus to the question of what and how to 
utilize the revenue. First of all it is to identify relevant bodies and sectors including 
non-oil sectors that the oil production would directly and indirectly have an impact on 
their socioeconomic lives and to build consensus as to the use of the revenue.  This 
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form of arrangement would hold government and other institutions linked to the 
windfall management accountable.  
 
For instance, in Indonesia, this required strengthening civil society groups (including 
the voice of agricultural producers) to express how the new revenues will impact their 
sector vis-à-vis other better connected interest groups such as those representing big 
business. There was a broad agreement around equity concerns, particularly the need 
to stabilize rural economies, and a clear government commitment to invest in local or 
rural communities. By and large, greater proportion of the funds was, thus, committed 
to finance community-driven development projects in rural communities, especially 
agriculture and labor-intensive industry.  In the case of Norway, policy makers 
responded to the demands of a broad-based partnership with non-oil exporters by 
implementing policies that focused on maintaining the competitiveness of the non-oil 
sectors during the 1970s and 1980s (Moss and Young, 2009). In Alaska, such a 
constituency was artificially created through the Permanent Fund Dividend (Moss 
and Young, 2009).  
  
In addition, government should put a mechanism in place to ensure that accumulating 
funds be put in foreign reserves, to run budget surpluses properly and to manage the 
nominal exchange rates in such a way to avoid real appreciation of the nation‟s 
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currency. By so doing the government can avoid external debt, and create stable 
economy for diversification to take place in the economy, all things being equal. 
 
7.8.3 Stability Fund 
 
The creation of Stabilization Fund (SF) for oil revenue is more important to Ghana 
for social and economic stability as Norway, Russia, Venezuela and Botswana have 
done for their natural resources. The Fund serves as a long-term savings for the 
Government to accumulate financial assets to help cope with future expenditures that 
would be demanded by the ageing population. For that reason, it is not advisable to 
invest in projects which can be justified for their high social returns with low 
commercial returns (Van Wijnbergen, 2008). This is often the case of a number of 
African countries such as Nigeria, Algeria, Angola and Guinea Bissau where public 
investment projects, which were public in nature with low commercial returns, make 
their implementation unattractive to the private sector. Stability Fund should thus be 
created and proceeds investment abroad in stock markets and sovereign bonds of non-
oil high income countries. Secondly, community development fund should also be 
created, similar to the national, but in different arrangement for its usage by the 
communities. The flow chart below is recommended for the creation of stabilization 
fund for the community 
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Figure 7:1: The proposed stability Fund 
 
 
  
 Returns of investment     Monitoring Com. Funds 
         
        Use of Com Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
    Monitoring the funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   5% com. Fund    access to C.Fund 
 
   Investment    Returns of investment 
   95% NSF 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author 
 
 
Secondly, there is the need to decouple transfers of funds from Stability Fund to the 
budget by equating transfers over an infinite number of years, which will aim at 
neutralizing price volatility and induce great budget volatility. 
 
Accountability and transparency mechanisms should be built into the institutional 
frameworks, as shown in (Figure 7.1) above in the absence of strong institutional. 
Recent evidence by Humphrey„s and Standby (2007) suggests that for such funds to 
National Economy/ 
Ministry of Finance 
Stability Fund 
Abroad 
Communities‟ 
projects 
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be effectively transparent and accountable, three things are necessary: (i) withdrawal 
decisions should be regulated by clear rules rather than general guidelines; (ii) key 
decisions should be made by broad bodies representing the interests of diverse 
political constituencies; and (iii) there should be high levels of transparency 
governing their operation. These three points are therefore necessary for the structure 
below to work effectively. 
Figure 7.2 Management of the fund 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
         
 
In minimizing risks for politicians‟ capturing the funds there should be a call for 
greater social accountability, which cannot take place without economic 
transparency. It is therefore right for Ghana to improve and implements the Freedom 
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of Information Act bill, which will re-enforce accountability mechanisms regarding:  
the publication of reports on revenue and their usage, and the disclosure of bidders‟ 
identity and bidding documents. The EITI ++ process by World Bank (2008) which 
offer assistance in designing contracts, monitoring operations, and collecting taxes 
would be great benefit. Furthermore, increased transparency should open the door to 
design a local institutional response to the risk of politician to capture the funds. This 
should be achieved by ensuring independence judiciary and judgments, freedom of 
the press. Various experiences from the rest of the World can inspire Ghana, but none 
of them will become effective if not fully and broadly owned locally.  
 
At the community level efforts should be made to ensure that the tenant of effective 
participation is strictly observed.  Thus freedom to express the views and 
communication should prevail; individuals can exert and be able to relate to the 
issues which may arise, be able to establish contact with other persons, exchange 
views and form social links. Nothing should prevent anyone the freedom to 
maneuver, physically, psychologically and socially, or constrain to take part 
effectively in a democratic process in the community. 
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7.8.4 The role of poverty reduction in improving the human development for the 
communities 
 
The causes of poverty is multifaceted including inability of the national economy to 
optimize benefits within the global system, low capacities through lack of education, 
vocational skills, entrepreneurial abilities, poor health and low levels of consumption 
through lack of access to capital, social assets and market opportunities. These factors 
basically consist of government expenditure and can be address by fiscal policy. The 
way revenue is allocated in terms of poverty reduction and income distribution, is 
crucial element to an expanding equality and reducing level of income inequality.  
Government allocation of resources has many competing demands and different 
objectives, all of which are directly linked to the improving quality of life of the 
people. One of the ways to improve the conditions in the communities is by income 
generation and redistribution to improve infant and child mortality, life expectancy, 
literacy rate and income equality. 
 
 Another one is to strive for reducing unemployment and reaching full employment, 
through allocation of resources to appropriate areas that will expand the activities of 
the communities rather than contracting or folding their socioeconomic activities. The 
third objective is the delivery and affordability or access of services both socially and 
economically to enhance their lives in the communities. All three are important for 
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socioeconomic development of the communities and can contribute to poverty 
reduction and inequalities for speedy economic growth. 
 
 
7.8.5 Redefinition of community  
 
A study of Hui and Kiong (1997:467) to ascertain people‟s perception of community 
and sense of belongingness (neighbor relation) found that the more extensive and 
deeper the level of neighboring interaction engaged in, the more likely the resident is 
to have positive evaluations of neighbor relations and hence to feel a sense of 
community in its locality.  
The first step in this development of sense of communism is community security. 
This area requires greater amount of redefining and reworking on the past concepts 
and understandings. The relative wide apart of these communities from each other 
even make it more contingent to redefine community life, and to depart from 
stereotypes and prejudices necessary for development. The perception against the 
communities as „narrow-minded‟ was not acceptable. Open discussion over ethnic, 
tribal and group differences should be encouraged, which will contribute to the 
redefinition of community.  
 
The second step is the question of whether the youth would be submissive to the 
norms of their elders and the value systems of the community. Over the years, 
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community norms and values were the underlined threats for the community‟s well-
being, sense of stability and security which all ethnic groups aligned themselves for 
coexistence. Government should develop moral-education programs which focus on 
the basic components of community security which should constitute the underlying 
basis for social contract. There should be moral education program that tries to 
provide for a common social expectation and understanding between the individual 
and the society. The government should adopt multi-tribal, multi-religious approach, 
by devising a mechanism by which each religious group could participate in the 
formulation of the program, especially in the area which touches on their moral or 
religion tenets. Given this mechanism, it would need only the joint concern of the 
various communities for swift action and agreement. This will serves as the basic 
structures for social input into policy making. The ability of the government to 
coordinate and control the participating parties like the case in Singapore, as well as, 
the ability of the parties to accept one another on equal terms will be indispensable in 
this regard. This implicit trust should be the foundation of community belonging, 
which should enhance social integration and ensure higher level of community 
security and cohesion. 
 
In safeguarding communities‟ needs, the following should be a priority to 
government 
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i. Strengthen district institutional structures (like that of Norway), roles and 
procedures for prioritizing and coordinating investment in support of 
comprehensive and integral community development. 
ii. Strengthen the ability of the district assembly to undertake coordination of 
development planning process to stimulate communities‟ development. 
iii. promote community participation as an integral part of planning and 
implementing projects at the communities 
iv. Progressively provide comprehensive economic and social services and 
infrastructure in support of transformation of the communities‟ economy 
v. Inject dynamism in the public sector in support of community and private 
sector initiatives 
vi. Set up mechanisms at the community level to assist the private sector, 
particularly small-scale enterprises to identify opportunities for initiative and 
investment 
vii. Set up agricultural service and industrial technology transfer agencies as first 
step to organizing and providing assistance including advice on credit 
facilities, and  
viii. Making sure that all economic and social activities conform to environmental 
conservation and improvement. 
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7.9 Conclusion  
 
 
The study of the impact of oil production in some oil economies in Africa, Middle 
East, Asia and Latin America highlights significant policy choices in the 
determination of socioeconomic outcomes. It has demonstrated that the Dutch disease 
or resource curse, mismanagement and corruption, conflicts, poor land reform, lack 
of cultural acculturation, poor community integration as a result of oil companies 
creating their own „kingdoms‟ with their own set of rules and regulations, as opposed 
to the norms and values of the people, poor institutional capacity, poor policy 
formulation and implementation and poverty will pose challenges to the 
socioeconomic development of the communities and Ghana as a whole. 
 
 But these challenges can be solved somewhat by the policy choices that leaders make 
through institutional arrangements that they construct and rely upon. Japan and 
Singapore provide good models for Ghana. This is because with less natural 
resources these countries adopted the appropriate policies that enabled them to 
improve their societies. They provide a carbon copy for both developed and 
developing economies in Asia. Ghana has no excuse but to take a look at what others 
have done. 
 
 140 
 
Ghana has come very far, if one recounts the historical narrative that traces the 
socioeconomic interaction between economic policy choices as against structure and 
agency in the implementation of policies. We can conveniently link the challenges 
and constraints to the delivery of future outcomes to the doorstep of the institutional 
development. The point to note is that macro and domestic structural variables 
interact to determine the socioeconomic development of the society. As pointed out 
by Rotberg (2004:25), “institutional fragilities and structural flaws contribute to 
failure, but those deficiencies usually hark back to decision or actions by men”. 
Through the interaction amongst the choices we can make and provide structures that 
can produce positive outcomes that every Ghanaian is wishing for. 
 
Taking a trajectory of Africa‟s oil exporting countries, from the beginning of oil 
production through the period of oil shock to date, matching up with the 
socioeconomic development in these economies raises more questions than answers.  
They are characterized by poor fiscal discipline, poor taxation and saving 
mobilization, mismanagement and corruption, conflicts, and lack of participation in 
development processes. Investment in political, social and economic institution and 
redistributive measures may be good strategy to adopt for the developmental needs of 
the communities and the country as a whole. Hence, it may be appropriate and more 
contingent to consider the above recommendation and implement them in full.  
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